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BEHAVIORAL ANTITRUST: A NEW
APPROACH TO THE RULE OF
REASON AFTER LEEGIN
Avishalom Tor*
William J. Rinner
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Leegin Creative Leath-
er Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., which replaced the longstanding per
se rule against resale price maintenance (RPM) with a rule of reason
approach, has resurrected the debate over RPM. Legal and economic
proponents of this practice again point to its potential procompetitive
benefits, while RPM detractors emphasize its possible anticompetitive
consequences. Despite their disagreements, scholars, the Court, and
the limited extant empirical data appear near-unanimous in agreeing
that such arrangements can either increase or decrease efficiency.
Consequently, the RPM debate predominantly revolves around the-
oretical assertions regarding the likely frequency and significance of
RPM's pro- versus anticompetitive manifestations.
Importantly, however, both camps in the RPM debate assume
that manufacturers are strictly rational actors, who employ only prof-
it-maximizing arrangements. In contrast, our behavioral analysis re-
veals that real-world, boundedly rational manufacturers are prone to
use RPM even in circumstances in which it is neither rationally pro-
competitive nor rationally anticompetitive. The available evidence
further shows this excessive reliance on RPM diminishes over time, as
biased manufacturers either learn of their mistake or are disciplined
by the market. The slow demise of this practice, however, may entail
efficiency losses over many years and sometimes generate competitive
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harm as well. Yet because RPM will sometimes be used procompeti-
tively, Leegin's rejection of its per se condemnation is still justified.
The present analysis therefore not only offers a novel account of
RPM, but also shows how boundedly rational RPM challenges the
various post-Leegin approaches developed by courts, enforcement
agencies, and scholars on both sides of the RPM debate. We close by
outlining our alternative, behaviorally informed, structured rule of
reason inquiry for this restraint.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Leegin Creative Leather
Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.' replaced the longstanding per se rule against
minimum resale price maintenance (RPM)2 with a rule of reason (ROR)
approach and resurrected the debate over this vertical restraint that for-
bids dealers from selling the products they have purchased from a manu-
facturer below a prescribed price.3 Proponents of this practice again
point to its potential procompetitive benefits, while RPM detractors em-
phasize its possible anticompetitive consequences.'
Despite their disagreements, however, the Court, legal and econom-
ic scholars, and the limited available empirical data appear near-
unanimous in agreeing that such arrangements can either increase or de-
crease efficiency.' Consequently, the RPM debate predominantly re-
volves around theoretical assertions regarding the likely frequency and
significance of RPM's pro- versus anticompetitive manifestations.6 Im-
portantly, however, all of these theories also assume-like traditional an-
titrust scholarship more generally-that manufacturers are strictly ra-
tional actors who employ only profitable RPM arrangements.7
1. 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
2. Maximum RPM, which is not examined in this Article, was made subject to ROR analysis
instead of per se condemnation already in State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). Our references to
RPM, thus, only concern minimum RPM.
3. See generally Ashley Doty, Leegin v. PSKS: New Standard, New Challenges, 23 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 655 (2008); Warren S. Grimes, The Path Forward After Leegin: Seeking Consensus Reform
of the Antitrust Law of Vertical Restraints, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 467 (2008); Thomas A. Lambert, A De-
cision-Theoretic Rule of Reason for Minimum Resale Price Maintenance, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 167
(2010) [hereinafter Lambert, A Decision-Theoretic Rule]; Thomas A. Lambert, Dr. Miles is Dead.
Now What?: Structuring a Rule of Reason for Evaluating Minimum Resale Price Maintenance, 50 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1937 (2009) [hereinafter Lambert, Now What?]; Lance McMillian, The Proper Role
of Courts: The Mistakes of the Supreme Court in Leegin, 2008 Wis. L. REV. 405; Barak Y. Orbach, An-
titrust Vertical Myopia: The Allure of High Prices, 50 ARIz. L. REv. 261 (2008); Scott Looper, Note,
Reading Roberts: A Critical Framework for Analyzing The Supreme Court's Decision in Leegin Crea-
tive Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 46 Hous. L. REV. 177 (2009).
4. See infra notes 38-61 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 62-82 and accompanying text.
6. For a helpful overview of theoretical justifications for RPM agreements, see Ittai Paldor, The
Vertical Restraints Paradox: Justifying the Different Legal Treatment of Price and Non-Price Vertical
Restraints, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 317, 326-51 (2008).
7. Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, and Legal Poli-
cy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 482, 488 (2002) [hereinafter Tor, Entry]; Avishalom Tor, Illustrating a Behavi-
orally Informed Approach to Antitrust Law: The Case of Predatory Pricing, 18 ANTITRUST 52, 52-53
(2003) [hereinafter Tor, Illustrating]; see also Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Beha-
vioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV.
1051, 1053 (2000) (discussing the growth of behavioral economics as a critique of rational choice mod-
els); Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 261 (2010) (critiquing
the prevalence of rationality assumptions embedded in antitrust doctrine); Maurice E. Stucke, Beha-
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In contrast, a behavioral analysis of RPM reveals that real-world,
boundedly rational manufacturers" are prone to overestimating the dan-
gers of retail price-cutting, are excessively averse to such practices, and
exhibit a systematic bias in favor of RPM over alternative distribution ar-
rangements.9 Hence, manufacturers who are free to employ RPM will
overuse it, often harming both themselves and their retailers. 0
Both the historical evidence and relevant empirical findings further
suggest the excessive reliance on RPM diminishes over time, as biased
manufacturers either learn when the practice is inefficient or are discip-
lined by the market." However, the slow demise of RPM entails signifi-
cant efficiency losses and sometimes even consumer harm over many
years. At the same time, because RPM can also be efficiency enhancing,
Leegin's rejection of its per se condemnation in favor of a ROR analysis
may well be justified. 2
The present analysis therefore offers a novel account of RPM
which, in turn, provides a new foundation for developing an effectively
structured ROR analysis of this vertical restraint. To this end, Part I
briefly reviews the history, theory, and evidence on RPM, as well as the
central role of the assumption of manufacturer rationality in the debate
over this practice. Part II then shows how behavioral evidence reveals
that real-world manufacturers tend excessively to use RPM to combat re-
tail price-cutting. Part III explains that firms and markets may correct
the overuse of RPM, albeit slowly and in limited circumstances. Part IV
completes the analysis, first reevaluating Leegin's guidance and finding it
relevant, if lacking in important respects, then showing how the findings
presented here challenge both extreme pro-defendant and extreme pro-
plaintiff approaches to RPM's new rule of reason, and finally outlining
the contours of our suggested blueprint for a behaviorally informed,
structured rule of reason after Leegin.
I. THE RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE DEBATE
A. A Brief History
In the 1911 case Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons
Co.," the Supreme Court proclaimed the per se illegality of RPM.14 Dr.
vioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the Twenty-First Century, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 513 (2007).
See generally infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
8. See Avishalom Tor, The Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law, 4 HAIFA L. REV.
237, 242-44 & n.16 (2008) (discussing the evolution of the concept of bounded rationality and explain-
ing the present, broader usage); see also Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69Q.J. EcoN. 99 (1955); Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, 63
PSYCHOL. REv. 129 (1956) (developing the original concept of bounded rationality).
9. See infra Part IID.
10. See infra Part Ill.B-C.
11. See infra Part ILA-C.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
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Miles, a manufacturer of nonprescription, trademarked drugs, entered
into contracts specifying the "minimum prices at which sales shall be
made by its vendees and by all subsequent purchasers who traffic in its
remedies."" The defendant dealer, Park, refused to enter into such a
contract and continued selling Dr. Miles's drugs to discounting retailers
who then sold them at prices below those specified in the restraining con-
tracts.'" The Supreme Court, however, found the contracts invalid under
section 1 of the Sherman Act."
Although the per se rule of Dr. Miles was affirmed continually in
the following decades,'8 its impact was curtailed for almost forty years by
the passage of the Miller-Tydings Act of 1937 and the McGuire Act of
1955.19 These Acts amended the Sherman Act to allow RPM where per-
mitted by state "fair-trade" laws.20
Many states enacted fair-trade laws, explicitly permitting manufac-
turers to employ RPM in their distribution systems.21 Notably, many of
the products for which prices were fixed were common over-the-counter
products that involve minimal retail service.22 Yet despite the initial
popularity of RPM, its usage slowly declined over time.2 3 Competition
from states that did not enact fair trade laws or from new entry into the
market, evasion by discounting retailers, and other factors made RPM
less attractive to manufacturers than it originally seemed.2 4 Ultimately,
14. For a detailed discussion of the decision and its reading, see 8 PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR
APPLICATION I1 1620a-1620c, at 222-33 (3d ed. 2010).
15. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 394.
16. Id. at 381-82.
17. Id. at 400, 408-09. Justice Holmes dissented. Id. at 409 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Section 1 of
the Sherman Act is codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
18. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149 (1968); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn
& Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379-80 (1967); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 45-47 (1960).
For more recent opinions, see, for example, Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 735-
36 (1988), and Rebel Oil Co., Inc., v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421,1444 (9th Cir. 1995).
19. McGuire Act, ch. 745, sec. 2, § 5(a)(2)-(5), 66 Stat. 631, 632 (1955), repealed by Consumer
Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, § 3, 89 Stat. 801, 801; Miller-Tydings Act, ch. 690, tit. 8,
sec. 1, § 1, 50 Stat. 693, 693-94 (1937), repealed by Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975 § 2, 89 Stat. at
801.
20. McGuire Act, sec. 2, § 5(a)(2)-(5), 66 Stat. at 632; Miller-Tydings Act, sec. 1, § 1, 50 Stat. at
693 ("[Permits] agreements prescribing minimum prices for the resale of a commodity which ... is in
free and open competition with commodities... produced or distributed by others."). These state
laws allowed manufacturers to fix retail prices, further bolstered by Congress's passage of the McGuire
Act that allowed states to enact non-signer provisions, where minimum prices specified in one dealer's
agreement would bind all others. McGuire Act, sec. 2, § 5(a)(2)-(5), 66 Stat. at 632; Richard Squire,
Antitrust and the Supremacy Clause, 59 STAN. L. REV. 77, 84 n.30 (2006) (describing these provisions).
For detailed descriptions, see generally 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, 91 629, at 336-43;
S.C. Hollander, United States of America, in RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE 65 (B.S. Yamey ed., 1966).
21. See generally Note, Fair Trade Laws and Discount Selling, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1327 (1951)
(providing an overview and analysis of state fair trade laws).
22. Robert Pitofsky, Are Retailers Who Offer Discounts Really "Knaves"?: The Coming Chal-
lenge to the Dr. Miles Rule, ANTITRUST, Spring 2007, at 61, 63.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 220-26.
24. Hollander, supra note 20, at 81.
No. 3] 809
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
Congress repealed both the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts in 1975,
reinstating the per se rule of Dr. Miles.2
While the reinstatement of the per se rule significantly constrained
manufacturers wishing to employ RPM, it did not prevent them from in-
fluencing retail prices altogether, due to the Colgate doctrine.6 Colgate,
handed down less than a decade after Dr. Miles and subsequently con-
firmed and refined by later opinions, permitted manufacturers unilateral-
ly to establish and enforce resale pricing (and other distribution) poli-
cies.27 Because of the legal uncertainty concerning Colgate's boundaries,
however, manufacturers employing RPM under this doctrine risked lia-
bility under Dr. Miles if a court was to find that their interaction with re-
tailers amounted to an "agreement."28
The Supreme Court in Leegin explicitly overruled Dr. Miles and
adopted a rule of reason for evaluating RPM.29 The case arose when
PSKS discounted Leegin's "Brighton" line of leather belts despite Lee-
gin's announced policy of only selling to non-discounting dealers. 0 Lee-
gin ceased selling to PSKS when the latter refused to halt its discounting,
and the retailer sued, alleging Leegin violated section 1 of the Sherman
Act.' The district court excluded Leegin's offered evidence of the al-
leged procompetitive effects of its policy under the per se rule against
25. See Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, §§ 2-3, 89 Stat. 801, 801.
House and Senate reports suggested the undesirability of RPM as an arrangement that inhibits price
competition and facilitates cartels that raise consumer prices. S. REP. No. 94-466, at 2-3 (1975), re-
printed in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1569, 1570-72; H.R. REP. No. 94-341, at 1-5 (1975).
26. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919); see also 8 PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR
APPLICATION I 1623g, at 244-45 (2d ed. 2004) (explaining that, prior to Leegin, "[t]hrough ... indirect
methods ... a manufacturer can, even without resale price maintenance contracts, shape the manner in
which its product is distributed and influence its price-though obviously to a lesser extent than if Dr.
Miles were overruled. Because the manufacturer's lawful leeway in maintaining desired resale prices
does not approach the effectiveness of vertical price-fixing agreements, its practical effect is not to make
the Dr. Miles rule futile." (emphasis added)).
27. E.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); see also 7 PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND
THEIR APPLICATION 1446, at 75-85 (3d ed. 2010) (discussing the requisites for finding an agreement
after Monsanto).
28. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, 1623d, at 273 ("The
courts, however, have vacillated in finding announced conditions and their implementation to be or to
reflect agreements."). Intriguingly, the courts may have struck a practical balance between the posi-
tions of the two camps on RPM through the combination of the Dr. Miles and Colgate doctrines, leav-
ing vertical-price control an attractive alternative mainly for those manufacturers who believed that
they stood to benefit from its unilateral imposition enough to justify the risk that their policies might
be found to be an illegal "agreement." Of course, regardless of its merits and demerits, the potential
benefits of this adaptive approach are irrelevant in the post-Leegin era.
29. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877,907 (2007). Leegin followed
a series of decisions chipping away at per se restrictions on vertical arrangements over a few decades.
E.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 21-22 (1997); Monsanto Co., 465 U.S. at 768; Cont'1 T.V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,59 (1977).
30. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 883. Leegin specifically sought dealers who would "support the Brighton
product." Id. at 883.
31. Id. at 884.
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RPM.3 2  PSKS won an award of $1,200,000, trebled to a total of
$4,000,000, including fees," and the Fifth Circuit upheld the decision.34
The Supreme Court, divided five to four, overturned the lower
court, deciding that the ROR should apply to RPM and stating that
"[t]he reasons upon which Dr. Miles relied do not justify a per se rule."
Reexamining the 1911 precedent and surveying economics literature
"replete with procompetitive justifications for a manufacturer's use of re-
sale price maintenance," the Court found sufficient justification to apply
the ROR.3 6. The opinion then explicitly left lower courts the task of de-
veloping RPM's ROR analysis, providing them only with "certain fac-
tors" relevant to the inquiry. 7
B. Theory
1. Anticompetitive Accounts
Scholars have proffered several explanations of the likely causes
and effects of RPM. Critics argue that such arrangements facilitate man-
ufacturing or retail-level cartels,3 8 which are inherently unstable and sub-
ject to secret defection by members undercutting the cartel's prices. 9 At
the manufacturing level, cartel members may have lower incentives or
fewer opportunities to cheat if retail prices are fixed and defections easi-
er to monitor.40  RPM can also facilitate retail-level cartels, allowing a
32. Id.
33. Id. at 884-85. Note that the trial court rejected Leegin's argument that its program was a
unilateral pricing policy, rather than an "agreement," and therefore lawful under Colgate. See PSKS,
Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., No. Civ.A. 2:03-CV-107, 2004 WL 5254322, at *2 (E.D.
Tex. Aug. 17, 2004). Leegin did not pursue this argument on appeal.
34. PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 171 F. App'x 464, 470 (5th Cir. 2006).
35. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 880,889,907-08.
36. Id. at 889. In dissent, Justice Breyer noted a bright-line rule provided greater certainty and
pointed to stare decisis considerations. Id. at 917, 923-29 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 897 (majority opinion); see also infra Part IV (evaluating the factors enumerated by the
Court in light of the analysis in this Article). Note that, on remand, the district court granted Leegin's
motion to dismiss, which the Fifth Circuit subsequently affirmed, because PSKS did not adequately
define the relevant product market, and its new horizontal price-fixing claim did not properly allege an
agreement among retailers. PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., No. CV 2:03 CV
107(TJW), 2009 WL 938561, at *1, *5, *8 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2009), affd, 615 F.3d 412 (5th Cir. 2010).
38. See generally William S. Comanor, Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the
New Antitrust Policy, 98 HARV. L. REv. 983 (1985); Warren S. Grimes, Brand Marketing, Intrabrand
Competition, and the Multibrand Retailer: The Antitrust Law of Vertical Restraints, 64 ANTrTRUST L.J.
83 (1995).
39. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J.
135, 141-42 (1984).
40. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Vertical Restrictions and Monopoly Power, 64 B.U. L. REv. 521,
534 (1984); Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 86, 99-104
(1960) (describing manufacturer cartelization in the light bulb industry); Oliver E. Williamson, Assess-
ing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA.
L. REV. 953, 967 (1979). Note also that RPM can only be employed by manufacturers possessing at
least some market power who are able to earn supra-competitive profits that can be shared with retail-
ers through RPM. See, e.g., Nancy T. Gallini & Ralph A. Winter, On Vertical Control in Monopolistic
Competition, 1 INT'L. J. INDUS. ORG. 275, 285 (1983) (showing that vertical restraints can be "profita-
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single manufacturer or "upstream" firm to impose uniform price condi-
tions on retail cartel members, making it easy for retailers to detect each
other's cheating or defection.4'
More importantly, even in the absence of express cartelization at ei-
ther the upstream or downstream levels, a widespread use of RPM in an
industry can "soften" competition in concentrated markets.4 2  When
there is a limited number of manufacturers or retailers, this practice
makes easier supra-competitive, oligopolistic pricing that causes signifi-
cant consumer harm yet is not illegal due to its high enforcement and er-
ror costs. 43
Finally, manufacturers may introduce RPM as a quid pro quo for
dealers' agreement to other vertical restraints, such as tying or exclusive
dealing, that may foreclose competing manufacturers. In the absence of
the increased profits provided by RPM, dealers may be unwilling to
commit to accept the latter, costly arrangements. 44
2. Procompetitive Effects
Many economic theorists nevertheless have put forth reasons why
RPM might prove welfare enhancing, mostly relying on the argument
that retailers can provide services that enhance demand and total sales of
manufacturers' products.45
For example, Bowman and Tesler famously argued that product-
specific services, such as product demonstrations, can stimulate demand,
but free riding may prevent their provision when retailers compete over
price. 46 Discounting retailers, who do not incur the cost of providing ser-
vices, can reduce product prices, benefiting from or free riding on their
bly imposed by a manufacturer or wholesaler who has some market power and whose product is sold
in a monopolistically competitive downstream market" under specified circumstances).
41. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, EcONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 4.1, at 87-89
(1985).
42. See James C. Cooper et al., A Comparative Study of United States and European Union Ap-
proaches to Vertical Policy, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 289, 293 (2005); Patrick Rey & Joseph Stiglitz,
The Role of Exclusive Territories in Producers' Competition, 26 RAND J. ECON. 431,432 (1995).
43. See ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 383, 387 (1995). But see Rich-
ard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1563
(1969) (suggesting that oligopolistic coordination should be illegal). See generally Herbert Hoven-
kamp, The Rationalization of Antitrust, 116 HARv. L. REv. 917, 936 (2003) (reviewing RICHARD A.
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001)) (discussing Phillip E. Areeda's Antitrust Law treatise's posi-
tion on oligopoly behavior).
44. See Alan J. Meese, Raising Rivals' Costs: Can the Agencies Do More Good than Harm?, 12
GEO. MASON L. REV. 241,264-65 (2003).
45. Note that all the services-related accounts of RPM assume that retailers' demand-increasing
activities are always efficient and beneficial. If, however, retailers divert demand from competing
products based on their private benefits from larger margins, increased demand for a given product
may not be efficient. Moreover, although outside the present scope, most procompetitive accounts of
RPM depend on a questionable assumption of consumer rationality in choosing among products and
services.
46. See Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Prerequisites and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 22 U.
CHI. L. REv. 825, 835-36 (1955); Telser, supra note 40, at 89-96.
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competitors' investment.47 RPM can overcome free riding by removing
the possibility of price-cutting, encouraging retailers to compete over
service provision. The resulting increased demand and consumer percep-
tion of value may offset the higher prices caused by RPM.48
One frequent concern raised by manufacturers involves the retailer
practice of "loss leading"-that is, the discounting of certain products to
draw in consumers who will be more likely to buy additional products or
services that more than compensate for the discount sale.49 These manu-
facturers favor minimum resale price agreements as an effort to prevent
loss-leading discounts that could harm a brand's image and reduce a
product's value. Despite the long-standing concern of manufacturers
over loss leading, 0 this justification for RPM has not gained substantial
traction among scholars."
Closely related, others suggest that RPM can promote consumer
welfare through brand promotion and improved goodwill. 52 Though
manufacturers can control their brand through advertising, retailer or
dealer services can heighten a brand's image. Brand imaging often is es-
sential to wide distribution and high-volume, low-cost production of
goods, because new products under the same brand will have higher de-
mand than new products of unknown brands.3
Marvel and McCafferty similarly argue that dealers or retailers act
as agents for consumers by choosing which products to sell and thereby
endorsing these brands or products.5 4 If consumers recognize that retail-
47. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890 (2007)
("[D]iscounting retailers can free ride on retailers who furnish services and then capture some of the
increased demand those services generate."); Cont'1 T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55
(1977); Telser, supra note 40, at 91.
48. See Easterbrook, supra note 39, at 169-72; Benjamin Klein & Andres V. Lerner, The Ex-
panded Economics of Free-Riding: How Exclusive Dealing Prevents Free-Riding and Creates Undi-
vided Loyalty, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 473, 484-90 (2007); Paldor, supra note 6, at 333; Richard A. Posner,
The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV.
6, 6 (1981); see also Ralph A. Winter, Vertical Control and Price Versus Nonprice Competition, 108
Q.J. EcoN. 61 (1993) (arguing that RPM prevents retailers from focusing on infra-marginal consum-
ers).
49. E.g., Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty, The Welfare Effects of Resale Price Mainten-
ance, 28 J.L. & ECON. 363, 375 (1985).
50. See, e.g., AM. FAIR TRADE COUNCIL INC., RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE BY MEANS OF
FAIR TRADE LAWS IN FORCE APRIL 1, 1942, at 3 (1942); see also Leegin, 551 U.S. at 883 (noting that
one of the reasons Leegin stated for adopting its RPM policy was the "concern that discounting
harmed Brighton's brand image and reputation").
51. Cf Howard P. Marvel, The Resale Price Maintenance Controversy: Beyond the Conventional
Wisdom, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 59, 73-77 (1994) (detailing the theory of price cutting and loss leading).
But see Orbach, supra note 3, at 277-82 (arguing that consumers sometimes value high prices in and of
themselves).
52. See generally Robert L. Steiner, Judging the Welfare Performance of Manufacturers' Adver-
tising, 10 J. ADVERTISING, no. 3, 1981, at 3, 12-13 (detailing procompetitive theories of product brand-
ing through vertical restraints).
53. See Nicholas S. Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523, 525-
27 (1988); Steiner, supra note 52, at 12-13.
54. See generally Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty, Resale Price Maintenance and Quali-
ty Certification, 15 RAND J. ECON. 346 (1984).
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ers choose a narrow range of products to sell from among multiple
brands, such information is a valuable quality endorsement of the brands
selected.
Some scholars have suggested that RPM may be needed to provide
smaller, higher-cost retailers with margins sufficient for their survival,
without which product availability may be diminished." A critical evalu-
ation of this account reveals, however, that the benefits of this increased
availability must, first, outweigh the lost sales due to higher prices
throughout the distribution system and, second, be unattainable simply
through the willingness of some customers to pay higher prices for such
"convenience goods," both of which conditions are likely to be met in
very limited circumstances. 6
RPM also may be a superior enforcement mechanism in contracts
for the provision of services at the time of sale or post-sale, such as park-
ing space, installation, warranty, or repair services that are not subject to
free riding, as shown by Bolton and Bonanno and others." Murphy and
Klein similarly argue that specific contract provisions requiring point-of-
sale services are infeasible and inefficient given the high cost of monitor-
ing whether retailers comply with them.18 On the other hand, by prevent-
ing markdowns and allowing dealers to share the manufacturer's rents,
RPM creates strong incentives for retailers to provide such services."
Seeking further to extend the service-encouragement account of
RPM, Klein and others argued recently that retailers lack sufficient in-
centives to effectively promote a manufacturer's products even absent
55. BASIL S. YAMEY, THE ECONOMICS OF RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE 49-53 (1954) (suggest-
ing the outlets hypothesis as one account of RPM); J.R. Gould & L.E. Preston, Resale Price Mainten-
ance and Retail Outlets, 32 ECONOMICA 302, 308-11 (1965) (offering a model where RPM increases
the number of outlets and overall output).
56. See Robert H. Bork, A Reply to Professors Gould and Yamey, 76 YALE L.J. 731, 733-34
(1967) (detailing the various assumptions required for the outlet hypothesis to hold); Gould & Pres-
ton, supra note 55, at 311 (noting the limitations of their own model). See generally 8 AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, 1 1615d, at 192-95 (providing a detailed analysis of the outlets account
and its severe limitations). Notably, however, at least one case of RPM appears to fit the outlets
hypothesis better than alternative RPM accounts. See In re Coming Glass Works, 85 F.T.C. 1061
(1975), modifying 82 F.T.C. 1675 (1973), affd sub nom. Coming Glass Works v. FTC, 509 F.2d 293
(7th Cir. 1975); Pauline M. Ippolito & Thomas R. Overstreet, Jr., Resale Price Maintenance: An Eco-
nomic Assessment of the Federal Trade Commission's Case Against the Corning Glass Works, 39 J.L. &
ECON. 285 (1996) (examining the details of In re Corning Glass Works and its fit with the various ac-
counts of RPM).
57. See Patrick Bolton & Giacomo Bonanno, Vertical Restraints in a Model of Vertical Differen-
tiation, 103 Q.J. ECON. 555, 555 (1988) (showing that RPM, inter alia, is superior to simple linear price
contracts in inducing pre- and post-sale services, although it does not restore vertical efficiency); Tho-
mas A. Piraino, Jr., The Case for Presuming the Legality of Quality Motivated Restrictions on Distribu-
tion, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1988); see also Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433
U.S. 36. 55 (1977) (describing "service and repair facilities necessary to the efficient marketing" of a
manufacturer's products as justification for vertical restraints). But see Grimes, supra note 38, at 102
("Dealers also have a built-in incentive to provide many presale amenities because they translate di-
rectly into increased sales.").
58. See generally Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforce-
ment Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1988).
59. Id. at 285, 295.
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free riding.w Due to the incompatible interests of manufacturers, who
have much to gain from the voluntary provision of services, and retailers,
who have little, there exists "a profitable opportunity for manufacturers
to design distribution arrangements whereby retailers are compensated
for supplying increased manufacturer-specific promotional efforts.""1
C. Evidence
The case for RPM is premised on its welfare-enhancing conse-
quences.62 Yet the several extant case studies that provide evidence of
free riding in products such as automobiles, wallcovering, and personal
computers, do not show that free riding creates detrimental economic
consequences.63
At the same time, empirical studies also suggest that RPM can facil-
itate express manufacturer cartels. 4 The evidence regarding the overall
effects of RPM includes both studies that compare sales and profits of
manufacturers when RPM is permitted and when it is banned, and case
studies of specific industries, goods, or manufacturers. The first group
shows consistently that the abolition of RPM tends to lower retail profit
margins and prices, sometimes also increasing output,65 in line with the
boundedly rational account we develop below." Foreign country studies
of RPM in jurisdictions that permit or previously permitted the practice
further support the critics' view of anticompetitive effects. 7  Case studies
conducted in the United States and abroad provide similar results for
specific goods." Notably, if RPM only raises prices without increasing
60. Benjamin Klein, Competitive Resale Price Maintenance in the Absence of Free Riding, 76
ANTITRUST L.J. 431, 443 (2009).
61. Id. at 449; accord Benjamin Klein & Joshua D. Wright, The Economics of Slotting Contracts,
50 J.L. & ECON. 421 (2007); Winter, supra note 48.
62. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877,889-92 (2007).
63. E.g., Kenneth Kelly, The Role of the Free Rider in Resale Price Maintenance: The Loch Ness
Monster of Antitrust Captured, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 327, 329-30 & nn.6-8 (1988).
64. See, e.g., C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir. 1952).
65. S. REP. No. 94-466, at 2-3 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1569, 1570-72; H.R. REP.
No. 94-341, at 1-5 (1975). These reports found that prices ranged from sixteen to nineteen percent
higher in fair-trade states than in non-fair-trade states, and they estimated that the elimination of fair-
trade laws would save anywhere from $2.1 to $6.5 billion. S. REP. No. 94-466, at 2-3, reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1569, 1570-72; H.R. REP. No. 94-341, at 3-4; see also Stanley I. Ornstein & Dominique
M. Hanssens, Resale Price Maintenance: Output Increasing or Restricting? The Case of Distilled Spirits
in the United States, 36 J. INDUS. ECON. 1 (1987); Lawrence Shepard, The Economic Effects of Repeal-
ing Fair Trade Laws, 12 J. CONSUMER AFF. 220 (1978) (detailing the inefficiencies of the fair trade
laws and the consumer welfare gains resulting from their repeal).
66. See infra note 284 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., David Flath, Vertical Restraints in Japan, 1 JAPAN & WORLD ECON. 187 (1989);
L.A. Skeoch, Canada, in RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE, supra note 20, at 23; infra notes 210-17 and
accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., William A. McEachem & Anthony A. Romeo, Vertical Restraints in the Audio
Components Industry: An Economic Analysis of FTC Intervention, in IMPACT EVALUATIONS OF
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION VERTICAL RESTRAINTS CASES 201, 232-33 (Ronald N. Lafferty et al.
eds., 1984) [hereinafter IMPACT EVALUATIONS]; Sharon Oster, The FTC v. Levi Strauss: An Analysis
of the Economic Issues, in IMPACT EVALUATIONS, supra, at 68, 73-77 (finding that, after RPM was
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output, it is likely inefficient, while higher prices accompanied by in-
creased output would indicate consumers value the added services poten-
tially provided under RPM.69
Studies on price changes before and after the repeal of the fair trade
laws 0 provide a glimpse into the effects of RPM agreements. For exam-
ple, one study of bread prices in Washington concluded that after RPM
was enjoined, retail prices dropped while output did not-suggesting that
the agreement did not serve an efficient purpose."
Yet RPM also has some demonstrated beneficial effects. Empirical
studies summarized by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) suggest
that, though the impact of RPM varies considerably, the practice is pro-
competitive in some cases.72 For example, the FTC concluded from a
study of Coors beer before and after the decision to adopt RPM that the
practice resulted in improved dealer services and enhanced consumer
perceptions of quality." In a more ambiguous case, a shoe manufacturer,
Florsheim, used RPM arrangements that protected its company stores
from free riding, though it may not have been revenue maximizing for
the company.74
Ippolito's thorough empirical study of 203 litigated RPM cases be-
tween 1975 and 1982 also suggests that most uses of the practice in the
sample were procompetitive," concluding that "[b]ased on an analysis of
the products and the types of dealers in the cases, service- and sales-
enhancing theories, taken together, appear to have greater potential to
explain the practices."76  The author's own careful analysis, however, re-
veals that the cases likely concerned mostly procompetitive uses of RPM
(insofar as they concerned minimum RPM at all) due to strong selection
effects," thus shedding little light on the overall prevalence of pro- versus
anticompetitive RPM."
abandoned as a result of the FTC's suit, consumers benefitted from lower retail prices and the compa-
ny enjoyed higher profits).
69. Subject to the caveat discussed supra note 45.
70. For further discussion of these studies, see infra Part IV.A.
71. See THOMAS R. OVERSTREET, JR., BUREAU ECON., RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE:
ECONOMiC THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 22 n.2 (Nov. 1983), http://www.ftc.gov/be/
econrpt/233105.pdf (describing the results of Andrew James McLaughlin, An Economic Analysis of
Resale Price Maintenance (1979) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los An-
geles) (on file with Southern Regional Library Facility, University of California)).
72. See id. at 160-63; see also Lambert, Now What?, supra note 3, at 1989 (reexamining the
FTC's findings and arguing that "they cannot support the view that RPM is, more often than not, anti-
competitive").
73. OVERSTREET, supra note 71, at 125-26.
74. Id. at 122-23.
75. See Pauline M. Ippolito, Resale Price Maintenance: Empirical Evidence from Litigation, 34
J.L. & ECON. 263,266-67 (1991).
76. Id. at 291-92.
77. Ippolito's own account shows that the cases studied mostly concerned vertical practices other
than actual minimum RPM or involved the subset of cases where RPM is likely to be particularly effi-
cient. To wit, the data included a significant proportion of maximum RPM cases, which are irrelevant
for the present analysis, as well as other cases without any allegations of actual minimum RPM (only
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More recently, Peter Carstensen revisited the empirical evidence
behind several canonical antitrust cases involving vertical restraints, in-
cluding RPM, and found that in a number of cases the restraints served
anticompetitive or strategic behavior." The RPM agreements pushed by
manufacturers in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.," for example, like-
ly helped facilitate inefficient retail cartels."
All in all, the empirical evidence shows RPM results in higher mar-
gins for retailers and higher prices for consumers. There are indications
that the practice might either restrict or expand output. The empirical
data also suggests that RPM has facilitated both illicit and inefficient hor-
izontal behavior. The data does not establish clearly which outcomes-
negative or positive-are more likely to occur," but only indicate that a
widespread use of RPM in an industry is likely to have harmful effects.
D. The Assumption of Manufacturer Rationality
RPM scholarship and evidence indicate that this practice can either
increase or decrease efficiency but disagree on the likely frequency and
significance of its pro- versus anticompetitive manifestations. Important-
ly, however, following traditional economic analysis of law generally83
142 of 203 cases involved actual allegations of minimum RPM). Id. at 269 tbl.2. Moreover, because of
the dynamics of case selection in litigation under the per se rule, cases with strong RPM evidence
tended to settle, meaning the litigation sample represented disproportionately weak cases. This theo-
retical conclusion was confirmed by Ippolito's own analysis, which examined the subsample of private
cases that resulted in detailed published judgments based on standard antitrust grounds and found
only 11 of these 91 cases concerned minimum RPM allegations that were not objectively weak to begin
with. Id. at 274-76 & tbl.5. Finally, and importantly for the present purposes, the study involved RPM
litigation under the stringent per se approach that ruled in the years immediately following the final
repeal of the fair trade laws. This legal regime exposed manufacturers employing RPM to quick con-
demnation and treble damages (in private actions). Id. at 265. Consequently, one would expect only
those few, unrepresentative manufacturers who find RPM exceptionally beneficial to take the extreme
risk involved in its continued illegal use. In a sample involving only non-settled and thus predominant-
ly weak cases, however, we should not be surprised to find a significant proportion of potentially pro-
competitive RPM cases. Cf Lester G. Telser, Resale Price Maintenance, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 323, 326 (Peter Newman ed., 2002) (acknowledging some
of the selection effects in Ippolito's study).
78. Note that this observation does not detract from Ippolito's findings regarding the marginal
effects of the per se condemnation of all RPM and related practices as applied during the period of
1975-1982. See Ippolito, supra note 75. at 279.
79. See Peter C. Carstensen, The Competitive Dynamics of Distribution Restraints: The Efficiency
Hypothesis Versus the Rent-Seeking, Strategic Alternatives, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 569,594-606 (2001).
80. 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
81. Carstensen, supra note 79, at 595-96.
82. See OVERSTREET, supra note 71, at 160-64 (noting the ambiguous and varying empirical re-
sults of studies on RPM); HOWARD P. MARVEL, THE BENEFITS OF RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE 25
(2009), http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/rpm/docs/hmarvelppt0217.pdf (explaining, after summariz-
ing empirical evidence, that prices may rise as a result of RPM, but such effects do not provide a basis
for distinguishing between efficiency-enhancing and anticompetitive uses of RPM).
83. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (6th ed. 2003) ("The task of
economics ... is to explore the implications of assuming that man is a rational maximizer of his
ends...." (footnotes omitted)); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
1-2 (2004) (discussing the role of the rationality assumption in descriptive analysis and noting that "the
view taken will generally be that actors are 'rational"' and "maximize their expected utility"); Chris-
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and antitrust law and economics specifically," extant theories of RPM
uniformly assume manufacturers are strictly rational actors, who employ
only profit-maximizing RPM arrangements."
For instance, RPM detractors argue that it facilitates rational, anti-
competitive coordination among manufacturers or retailers.86 Therefore,
they interpret the empirical evidence showing that such arrangements
sometimes increase retail prices without increasing output as indicative
of such rational anticompetitive strategiesY
Similarly, supporters of RPM argue that manufacturers would never
use this practice unless its costs were justified by the profitable retail ser-
vices it encourages."s Otherwise, they assert, rational manufacturers
would not adopt such a practice but instead would maximize profits by
allowing retail-level competition to drive down prices and increase their
output.89
Yet a substantial body of empirical evidence demonstrates that
there are systematic deviations from strictly rational behavior, both at
the individual level and in aggregate market outcomes."0 In fact, Part II
reveals how some of these findings make real-world manufacturers prone
inefficiently and excessively to employ boundedly rational RPM, which
differs from both rationally anticompetitive and rationally procompeti-
tive manifestations of this practice.
tine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1481-85
(1998); Tor, supra note 8, at 239-41 (briefly reviewing rational actor models in law and economics).
84. E.g., 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 1 113, at 140 (3d ed. 2006) ("As a general proposi-
tion business firms are (or must be assumed to be) profit maximizers . . ."); POSNER, supra note 43, at
ix ("[T]he issue in evaluating the antitrust significance of a particular business practice should be
whether it is a means by which a rational profit maximizer can increase its profits at the expense of
efficiency...."); Stucke, supra note 7, at 514; see also Tor, Entry, supra note 7, at 488 (discussing the
role of the rationality assumption in law and economics and providing further references).
85. In markets, rational managers and firms are assumed to maximize profits. See DENNIS W.
CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 12-13 (4th ed. 2005) ("The
standard assumption in most economic models is that the primary objective of a manager of a firm is
to maximize the firm's profits."); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND
ECONOMICS 10 (2d ed. 1989); JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 34-35
(1988); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 7, at 1053; Stucke, supra note 7, at 532-36.
86. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
89. See 1 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 84, S 113, at 140-43: POSNER, supra note 43, at ix;
MARVEL, supra note 82, at 4 ("No manufacturer will ever wish unilaterally to keep its margins high
unless it sells more in consequence of those higher margins.").
90. See, e.g., Colin Camerer, Individual Decision Making, in THE HANDBOOK OF
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 587 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995).
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II. BOUNDEDLY RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
A. Real Manufacturers
Despite its centrality in RPM discourse, there is reason to believe
that the rationality assumption overstates the reality of manufacturers'
judgment and decision behavior. Specifically, for RPM always to be
profit maximizing, manufacturers must successfully accomplish a series of
challenging judgment and decision tasks under uncertainty. First, before
making any decisions, rational manufacturers must judge the expected
outcomes of retail price cutting in their distribution system.9 1 These are
an aggregate function of the various benefits and costs of every potential
consequence of price cutting to the manufacturer, multiplied by its prob-
ability.9 To reach this determination, a manufacturer must obtain and
analyze a large quantity of information about its retailers, their distribu-
tion practices, and the interactions between these practices and the oper-
ations of its own business. This information, however, is only partly
available to the manufacturer or even to its retailers.9 3
Second, after determining the overall expected outcomes of price
cutting, manufacturers must also decide whether and how to address it.94
This choice should be based on the relative benefits and costs of alterna-
tive distribution arrangements because the dangers posed by price cut-
ting can often be addressed by various means beyond RPM, such as terri-
torial allocation, incentive contracts, and others.95  Ultimately, the
rational manufacturer employs RPM always and only when it is profit
maximizing.96
Importantly, however, there is evidence that real manufacturers-
like other decision makers-are not perfectly rational." Instead, they
possess limited cognitive resources and are affected by motivation and
91. All judgments are essentially probabilistic. See Tor, supra note 8, at 244-46; see also Robyn
M. Dawes, Behavioral Decision Making and Judgment, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
497 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998).
92. Rational action requires maximization of subjective expected utility and, in the case of deci-
sion making in markets, typically expected monetary outcomes. See MARK BLAUG, THE
METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMICS: OR How ECONOMISTS EXPLAIN 229-30 (2d ed. 1992); JOHN VON
NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 617-28 (2d ed.
1947) (providing a technical appendix of expected utility theory); see also sources cited supra notes 72-
82.
93. See Hovenkamp, supra note 40, at 534.
94. See Arnold C. Cooper et al., Entrepreneurs' Perceived Chances of Success, 3 J. BUS.
VENTURING 97, 99-100, 106 (1988); Tor, supra note 8, at 257-72; see also Dawes, supra note 91, at
497-99.
95. See infra note 174 and accompanying text (briefly discussing alternatives to RPM and citing
some further references).
96. Cf 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, 1 1633d, at 381-85 (describing the issues a
court seeking to determine whether a given instance of RPM serves a legitimate function must ascer-
tain).
97. For a discussion of the possible advantages of manufacturing managers, who operate within
firms, in market settings, over individual decision makers, see infra Part III.B-D.
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emotion-that is, they are "boundedly rational."" To function in a com-
plex world, manufacturers use mental and emotional heuristics when
making judgments under uncertainty and rely on situational cues to
guide their choices." While highly adaptive and often useful,'" however,
heuristic judgment and cue-dependent choice also lead decision makers
systematically and predictably to deviate from strictly rational beha-
vior.10'
More specifically, the empirical evidence amassed by behavioral de-
cision researchers suggests that a confluence of psychological processes
biases manufacturers toward unduly negative judgments of the expected
harms of, and an aversion to, retail price cutting on the one hand and an
excessive preference for RPM as the means for addressing price-cutting
on the other.102 The following sections examine these judgment and deci-
sion processes, showing how they converge to lead some manufacturers
to employ RPM excessively and inefficiently.
98. See supra note 8.
99. See, e.g., Tor, supra note 8, at 242.
100. See, e.g., BOUNDED RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX (Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard
Selten eds., 2001); JOHN W. PAYNE ET AL., THE ADAPTlVE DECISION MAKER 2 (1993) (developing the
thesis that the use of heuristics and varying decision strategies "is an adaptive response of a limited-
capacity information processor to the demands of complex decision tasks").
101. See generally Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some
Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARv. L. REV. 1420 (1999) (presenting case studies of consum-
er and firm behavior that systematically produce market outcomes that deviate from rational choice
model predictions); Jolls et al., supra note 83, at 1481-85 (identifying testable predictions stemming
from behavioral economic theory in which economic factors may display systematic deviations from
rational behavior); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 7, at 1126-38 (discussing deviations from profit-
maximizing behavior, based on social norms, fairness concerns, and collective action).
102. See infra Part II.D.
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JUDGMENT
OR BEHAVIORAL EFFECT APPLICATION CONSEQUENCE
DECISION
PROCESS
Insufficiently adjusting judgments
Anchoring Insufficient adjustment of the incidence and harm offrom biased anchor price-cutting from biased informa-
tion
Events that are easier Overestimating the frequency of
to recall appear more harmful price-cutting based on a
Judgment by common few vivid events OVER-
Availability Dramatic turns-of-
events are easier to Making inflated predictions of ETIMATE
imagine and thus harmful price-cutting HARMFROM
appear more likely PRICE
Neglect of prior Too much weight given to anec- CUTING
probabilities (base dotal evidence of specific dis-
rates) counting events
Judgment by Judging as typical the characteris-
Representa- Insensitivity to sample tics of a small sample of discount-
tiveness size ing anecdotes
Insensitivity to Overweighting unreliable infor-
predictability mation
(reliability)
Losses vis-A-vis the Epnigrsucsta r
Loss AOver- status quo are more vrexte ting the rce oar
coparabule ansar from price-cutting to prevent po- PRICE-plearable g e tential losses CUTTING
PleasrableAVERSION
Willingness to sacrifice Engaging in costly prevention ef-
Fairness financial value to forts of retailers' free-riding beha-
Concerns prevent unfair viors that are subjectively viewed
outcomes as unfair
Continued on next page
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TABLE 1-Continued
JUDGMENT
OR
DECISION BEHAVIORAL EFFECT APPLICATION CONSEQUENCE
PROCESS
Seeking an alternative
Reason- that dominates other
Based alternatives with
Choice respect to a single, most Overweighting the elimination or
important, attribute price-cutting per se (as opposed to
Preference for solutions addressing its potential conse-
Compatibili- that are more directly quences)
ty Effect compatible with a
problem
Elimination of risk
Certainty valued more highly A PRO-RPM
Effect than its reduction by a PREFERENCE
comparable magnitude
Ambiguity Preference for well-
A version defined risks (or costs) Overestimating the benefits of
over ambiguous ones RPM
Excessive effort to con-
Managerial trol business risks
Risk Atti- Egocentric overestima-
tudes tion of managerial abili-
____________ty and skill________________
B. Overestimating the Expected Harm from Price-Cutting
1. Anchoring on Biased Information
To determine the expected harm of price-cutting, manufacturers
must collect data on both its prevalence and its consequences in their dis-
tribution system.' 3 Yet manufacturers may find retail-level conduct,
such as price-cutting, difficult to identify; they can engage in costly polic-
ing efforts, but still obtain only partial evidence. After identifying in-
stances of price-cutting, moreover, the manufacturer must determine
their effects, which vary depending on the practice and its specific cir-
cumstances. Price cuts are used both in the potentially harmful free-
riding (and maybe loss-leading) cases and in common, output-expanding,
short-term discounts of various kinds, clearance sales, and other benefi-
cial forms of price competition. Indications of the negative nature of a
given practice are occasionally available,"~ yet frequently are inconclu-
103. Note that even obtaining full information on a representative sample of cases from which
manufacturers might extrapolate overall effects may prove very difficult.
104. For instance, a prolonged practice could be a negative indication; and so would be its recur-
rence. Similarly, when a practice involves only the product or products of a specific manufacturer, loss
leading might be indicated (though not necessarily), while a practice that involves similar products of
competing manufacturers is more compatible with free riding (or other occasions of general dis-
counts). Where a manufacturer can verify that certain pre-sale services are not provided free riding is
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sive.0 s Consequently, the manufacturer may have to rely, at least in part,
on dealers' complaints, local advertising or media reports-to the extent
available-not just to identify price-cutting events but also to determine
their purpose and effect.w
Dealers' complaints and public information, however, are likely to
be biased, overstating both the frequency of price-cutting and its severity.
Complaining dealers clearly have an incentive to dramatize price-cutting,
which harms their profits regardless of its possible procompetitive bene-
fits. Other manufacturers and trade organizations are also likely to ex-
aggerate the occurrence and negative impact of loss leading and free rid-
ing to legitimate distribution restraints that tend to soften competition.5 0
Similarly, media reports of price-cutting occasions may dramatize their
magnitude and effect. After all, discounting retailers, who are trying to
attract customers, try to publicize their price-cutting, while those com-
plaining competitors seek to highlight the damage these practices cause
to distribution.108
Of course, manufacturers may well be aware of the potential biases
in their information sources. Studies show, however, that public risk per-
ceptions reflect media biases, even though the media's tendency to dram-
atize and emphasize are rare, extreme occurrences are well known?
Moreover, even a manufacturer who is fully aware of the bias in the data
is unlikely to sufficiently discount his information due to anchoring.
Anchoring occurs when people make estimates by starting from an
initial value, based on information provided by the environment or a par-
indicated, but monitoring services are difficult and costly. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying
text.
105. Such as the intentions of the retailer, the latter's profit margins on the manufacturer's prod-
ucts and on other products, and the extent to which he provides relevant services. Cf 8 AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, 1 1633d1, at 382 ("Unfortunately, there is no practical way to quantify
the actual ... detriments or benefits of resale price maintenance in a particular case in order to meas-
ure whether the net balance is plus or minus.").
106. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 765-66 (1984) (discussing the
viability of dealer complaints versus publicly available market evidence); see also Bus. Elecs. Corp. v.
Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988); Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430, 1440 (7th Cir.
1986) ("As long as the supplier's motive is ... only to maintain his system of lawful nonprice restric-
tions, he can terminate noncomplying dealers without fear of antitrust liability even if he learns about
the violation from dealers whose principal or perhaps only concern is with protecting their prices."); 7
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, 91 1454-1456, at 137-53.
107. See Cooper et al., supra note 42, at 293; Rey & Stiglitz, supra note 42, at 432. Moreover, the
interaction between manufacturers who, for the reasons explored below, independently overestimate
the problems of price-cutting reinforces this bias.
108. See, e.g., Walmart Expands Low-Cost Prescription Drug Program, Bus. J. (Aug. 18, 2009,
10:03 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/milwaukeelstories/2009/08/17/daily25.html (discussing Wal-
mart's well-advertised prescription drug program and its affect on competitors now choosing to offer
similar services); see also Joel E. Urbany & Peter R. Dickson, Competitive Price-Cutting Momentum
and Pricing Reactions, 2 MKTG. LETTERS 393 (1991) (investigating the phenomenon of "price-cutting
momentum" of competitive reactions to initial price-cutting decisions by examining retail grocery pric-
ing recommendations).
109. See, e.g., Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 463, 467-68 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)
[hereinafter JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY].
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tial computation, and then adjust that estimate to reach a final answer.110
In general, this intuitive, often unconscious, strategy reflects a logical use
of the available data, although the quality of the approximation depends
on the validity of the anchor. More problematically, however, research
shows that adjustments typically are insufficient, so that different starting
points lead to different estimates that are biased toward the initial val-
ue."' More importantly, insufficient adjustment occurs even for anchors
that are obviously irrelevant, patently wrong, biased, or extreme.1 12
For anchoring to occur, decision makers must note the anchor but
need not be aware they are anchoring on it."' In fact, recent studies have
shown anchoring operates even for clearly incidental anchors, with the
numbers on athletes' clothing biasing estimates of their performance; a
product's model number influencing estimates of the proportion of sales
in the domestic market; and even whether a restaurant was named "Stu-
dio 17" or "Studio 97" biasing estimates of how much participants would
dine there.114
Significantly, anchoring also affects professional decision makers,
such as accountants, finance executives, and real-estate brokers in their
domain of expertise."' All in all, manufacturing managers are likely to
anchor their estimates on the available information, with insufficient ad-
justment to account for the limitations and biases inherent in their
sources and a resulting overestimation of the frequency of price-cutting
as well as its negative consequences.116
110. Nicholas Epley & Thomas Gilovich, When Effortful Thinking Influences Judgmental Anchor-
ing: Differential Effects of Forewarning and Incentives on Self-Generated and Externally Provided
Anchors, 18 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 199, 209 (2005); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note
109, at 3, 14-18.
111. See, e.g., Paul Slovic & Sarah Lichtenstein, Comparison of Bayesian and Regression Ap-
proaches to the Study of Information Processing in Judgment, 6 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
PERFORMANCE 649 (1971); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 110, at 14-18.
112. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 110, at 14.
113. For one review of anchoring conditions, see Gretchen B. Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, Incor-
porating the Irrelevant: Anchors in Judgments of Belief and Value, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 120, 123-26 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter
HEURISTICS AND BIASES]. See also Nicholas Epley & Thomas Gilovich, Putting Adjustment Back in
Anchoring and Adjustment Heuristic: Differential Processing of Self-Generated and Experimenter-
Provided Anchors, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 391, 391-92 (2001).
114. Clayton R. Critcher & Thomas Gilovich, Incidental Environmental Anchors, 21 J. BEHAV.
DECISION MAKING 241 (2008).
115. See, e.g., Edward J. Joyce & Gary C. Biddle, Anchoring-and-Adjustment in Probabilistic Infe-
rence in Auditing, 19 J. ACCOUNTING RES. 120 (1981) (accountants); Gregory B. Northeraft & Marga-
ret A. Neale, Experts, Amateurs, and Real Estate: An Anchoring and Adjustment Perspective on Prop-
erty Pricing Decisions, 39 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 84 (1987) (real
estate brokers); Zur Shapira & Itzhak Venezia, Patterns of Behavior of Professionally Managed and
Independent Investors, 25 J. BANKING & FIN. 1573 (2001) (finding an anchoring-related disposition
effect in stock trading for both individual investors and, although to a lesser degree, investment firms);
see also Critcher & Gilovich, supra note 114, at 243-45 (finding in Study 1 that anchoring effects were
not qualified by participants' expertise in the relevant domain).
116. See also infra note 139 and accompanying text (discussing the limited effect of disclosure of
advisors' conflicts of interest on advisees' judgments of the advice given by the former).
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2. Availability Biases in Recall and Construction
The effects of biased anchors and insufficient adjustment are ex-
acerbated by the availability heuristic, which is often used to assess the
frequency of a class or the probability of events."' Judgment by availa-
bility relies on people's better and faster recall of instances of large
classes than of less common classes; on their finding it easier to imagine
likely occurrences than unlikely ones; and on the reinforcement of asso-
ciative mental connections when two events frequently co-occur."8
Availability-based judgments are rapid and effortless; decision
makers are therefore usually unaware of the processes they use to reach
these judgments.119 Judgments by availability also generate predictable
errors, for example, because some variables impact availability but not
probability and frequency. Thus, factors that make instances easier to
retrieve without changing their true probability lead to the overestima-
tion of such instances in availability-driven judgments.12 0 To illustrate,
people hold reasonable estimates of the relative lethality of various po-
tential causes of death (e.g., motor vehicle accidents, cancer). At the
same time, they systematically misestimate the frequency of those death
causes that tend to be under- or overpublicized.121
The relevance of availability-based judgments for manufacturers'
estimates is apparent: insofar as their information provides a biased sam-
ple of price-cutting events and their vivid and salient negative effects,122
117. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 110, at 11-14; see also Sefa Hayibor & David M. Wasie-
leski, Effects of the Use of the Availability Heuristic on Ethical Decision-Making in Organizations, 84 J.
Bus. ETHICS 151 (2009); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging
Frequency and Probability, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 109, at 163 [hereinafter
Tversky & Kahneman, Availability] (exploring different types of judgments by availability).
118. Loren J. Chapman & Jean P. Chapman, Illusory Correlation as an Obstacle to the Use of Va-
lid Psychodiagnostic Signs, 74 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 271 (1969); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note
110, at 13. When judging by availability, therefore, individuals substitute the ease of mental retrieval,
construction, or association for a direct estimation of the actual numerosity of a class, the likelihood of
an event, or frequency at which events co-occur. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 110, at 13-14; see
also Norbert Schwarz & Leigh Ann Vaughn, The Availability Heuristic Revisited: Ease of Recall and
Content of Recall as Distinct Sources of Information, in HEURISTICS AND BIASEs, supra note 113, at
103, 118 (disentangling two potential mechanisms underlying the effects of availability and concluding
that ease of recall is the mechanism of more general relevance).
119. See Baruch Fischhoff et al., Evolving Judgments of Terror Risks: Foresight, Hindsight, and
Emotion, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 124,126,135 (2005).
120. E.g., Tversky & Kahneman, Availability, supra note 117, at 164.
121. Paul Slovic et al., Rating the Risks, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 104, 107,111-19 (Paul Slovic
ed., 2000). Accidents are overestimated, being judged to cause as many fatalities as diseases, while the
latter in fact cause about sixteen times more deaths. Id. Similarly, the risk of homicide is dramatically
overestimated, while the risk of death by stroke is underestimated. Id. In general, overestimated
causes of death tend to be more dramatic and sensational, and thus both heavily publicized by the me-
dia and easier to recall. Underestimated risks, on the other hand, tend to be unspectacular events,
which claim one victim at a time, are common also in non-fatal form, and do not receive much publici-
ty. Slovic et al., supra note 109, at 465-72.
122. The natural salience of harmful price-cutting in manufacturers' minds is further reinforced by
individuals' preoccupation "with highly desirable outcomes... or with highly undesirable out-
comes.... Consequently, availability provides a mechanism by which occurrences of extreme utility
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manufacturers are likely to excessively recall these events and thus over-
estimate both the probability of price-cutting and the frequency of its
harmful manifestations.
Moreover, following recall of specific events, manufacturers may al-
so rely on availability for mental construction, especially when attempt-
ing to predict the overall likelihood of price-cutting and its effects.123
People commonly make an effort to recall relevant instances of an occa-
sion (e.g., how many times did it snow last March?) then supplement the
recollection by constructing a scenario. In this scenario they try to ac-
count for whatever aspects of the case at hand they consider important if
those are unique or simply not "covered" by the information retrieved
from memory (e.g., what is the likelihood it will snow this March, given
that the winter has been especially mild?).124 In the present case, there-
fore, manufacturers may evaluate the overall effect of price-cutting by
developing different scenarios of its potential consequences.
When engaging in mental construction, however, people tend to re-
ly on a simulation heuristic, a variant of availability.125 The simulation can
either start from existing conditions (e.g., how well will Ann and Joe,
who never met before, get along together?) or account for hypothetical
ones that might arise under a certain contingency (e.g., if Ann and Joe
get along together well, what is likely to happen?) then proceed to pro-
duce different potential outcomes.12 6
Importantly, however, the ease with which the simulation reaches a
particular result is used to judge the propensity of the real-life situation
under consideration to produce that state.'27 Consequently, the simula-
tion heuristic leads to a bias in favor of scenarios in which dramatic
events mark causal transitions.'" This finding is not surprising when con-
sidering how much more imaginable dramatic turns-of-events are than
those which involve minor, incremental changes. It implies, however,
that dramatic scenarios in which loss leading would lead to significant
(or disutility) may appear more likely than they actually are." Tversky & Kahneman, Availability,
supra note 117, at 178.
123. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Simulation Heuristic, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY, supra note 109, at 201, 202-03.
124. See Tversky & Kahneman, Availability, supra note 117, at 166, 175-78.
125. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 123, at 201.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. In one study, for instance, participants were presented with the story of a person who had
died in a car crash, including a description of the events leading to the man's death. They were then
asked to imagine a change in the story that would have avoided the death. All participants responded
by creating scenarios that changed one of the major events that led to the accident, such as the man
taking his usual route home rather than the unusual one he has taken in the story, rather than intro-
duce a minor-but far more likely-change in the story (such as having the man arrive just a few
seconds earlier or later at the intersection where the accident would occur). Id. at 203-07. Another
process that contributes to this bias is people's tendency to prefer coherent scenarios and overestimate
their likelihood, and at the same time to underestimate the aggregate effect of the numerous factors
that might prevent the realization of a dramatic, internally coherent scenario. Id. at 206-08.
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losses to the manufacturer by debasing his brand name, for instance,
would seem more probable than they really are.
3. The Consequences of Judgment by Representativeness
Judgments by representativeness are also likely to contribute to
manufacturers' overestimation of the expected harm of price-cutting.
Representativeness is used to assess the likelihood that an instance or an
event belongs to a certain class, or has originated from or caused another
event, substituting the degree to which the event resembles the class for
the actual likelihood that it belongs to that class.129 Relying on represent-
ativeness, for instance, decision makers may judge the guilt of a criminal
defendant or a suspect based on the degree to which he resembles the re-
levant class of offenders.13 0
As in the case of availability, judgments by similarity or representa-
tiveness are both relatively easy and typically sensible, because these var-
iables tend to correlate with the actual probability of judged events. The
common reliance on this proxy, however, also leads to systematic errors
because various factors affect probability but not similarity, and vice ver-
sa.' Three of these representativeness-driven errors in particular pro-
mote manufacturers' overestimation of the expected harm from price-
cutting: the neglect of the base rate (or prior probability) of substantially
damaging outcomes; the enhanced impact of a small number of instances
on the manufacturers' perception of the overall effects of price-cutting;
and the failure fully to account for the unreliability of the evidence of
these practices' consequences.
Base rate frequencies affect probability but not similarity and are
therefore often neglected when specific evidence is available.3 2  This
129. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representa-
tiveness, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 109, at 32, 38-47 [hereinafter Kahneman &
Tversky, Subjective Probability]; see also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and by
Representativeness, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 109, at 84, 85-90 (elaborating on
the representativeness relation).
130. E.g., Russell D. Covey, Criminal Madness: Cultural Iconography and Insanity, 61 STAN. L.
REv. 1375, 1381 (2009) ("If both judges' and jurors' initial exposure to criminal madness is through
popular media, their perceptions about the facts in individual cases are likely to be influenced by those
earlier exposures."); cf Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777, 805
(2001) ("When people make categorical judgments (e.g., assessing the likelihood that a criminal de-
fendant is guilty), they tend to base their judgments on the extent to which the evidence being ana-
lyzed (e.g., the defendant's demeanor) is representative of the category.").
131. See Maya Bar-Hillel, Studies of Representativeness, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY,
supra note 109, at 69,69; Maya Bar-Hillel & Efrat Neter, How Alike Is It? Versus How Likely Is It?: A
Disjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgments, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 113, at 82, 82-84;
Kahneman & Tversky, Subjective Probability, supra note 129, at 47.
132. Kahneman & Tversky, Subjective Probability, supra note 129 (describing various additional
variables that impact probability but not representativeness, including sample size, predictability, and
more). To illustrate, where the base-rate frequency of lawyers among one hundred participants in a
personality test study is thirty percent, with engineers comprising the other seventy percent, any ran-
domly selected test is more likely to belong to an engineer than to a lawyer. Because similarity is not
affected by base rates, however, people judge a brief description of a test-taking individual that more
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phenomenon can persist even for worthless or irrelevant evidence, only
disappearing when no information is available 33 or when the information
is nonspecific, impoverished or incoherent.N In real-life situations, how-
ever, evidence is rarely unavailable and the relevant evidence is usually
vivid, specific, 35 and causally related to the subject of the evaluation.'3
Consequently, the neglect of prior probabilities is common.
This neglect suggests that assessments of the harm caused by the re-
tailers' practices would be excessively based on the anecdotal informa-
tion manufacturers have, without proper regard to this data's prior prob-
ability. This information is vivid, as well as specifically and causally
related to the alleged effects on the manufacturers. The potentially low
prior probability of harmful price-cutting and the low incidence of those
salient occasions that allegedly cause significant harm would not be suffi-
ciently taken into account.
Representativeness also leads to insensitivity to sample size in
judgments of posterior probability. '3  Thus, decision makers overweigh
the characteristics displayed by the evidence they have, neglecting the
statistical implications of sample size (or the amount of evidence)-
namely, that large samples are likely to display the actual characteristics
of the population, while small samples are more likely to be uncharacter-
istic. Therefore, after learning of a few cases involving supposedly harm-
ful price-cutting, manufacturers may believe such occurrences are far
more typical than they actually are.
Finally, representativeness also causes insensitivity to predictabili-
ty-that is, to the reliability of the source of the information. 3 8 Such in-
sensitivity means, however, that manufacturers' estimates may be based
on the strength or extremeness of the available evidence of price-cutting,
without sufficient regard to its weight or credence. Moreover, recent re-
search has specifically shown that even decision makers who are aware of
closely resembles the stereotype of a lawyer than that of an engineer as highly likely to belong to a
lawyer, regardless of the two professions' base rates in the study. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky,
On the Psychology of Prediction, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 109, at 48, 53-57
[hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky, Psychology of Prediction]; cf Maya Bar-Hillel, The Base Rate Fal-
lacy Controversy, in DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 39, 39-43 (Roland W. Scholz ed., 2d
ed. 1989).
133. Kahneman & Tversky, Psychology of Prediction, supra note 132, at 56.
134. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Evidential Impact of Base Rates, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY, supra note 109, at 153, 158.
135. Richard E. Nisbett et al., Popular Induction: Information Is Not Necessarily Informative, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY,supra note 109, at 101, 111-12.
136. Bar-Hillel, supra note 132, at 45-48.
137. That is, the probability that a sample was drawn from a particular population. Tversky &
Kahneman, supra note 110, at 5-7.
138. Id. at 8. Additional factors involved in the creation of this illusion were identified in id. at 9.
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their advisors' conflicts of interest-as is likely the case with the manu-
facturers' sources-do not sufficiently discount their advice. 13 9
C. Price-Cutting Aversion
Manufacturers' tendency to overestimate the expected harm of
price-cutting is reinforced by two decision phenomena-loss aversion
and fairness-driven behavior-that make them particularly averse to the
negative consequences of price-cutting and thus more likely than rational
manufacturers to prevent their occurrence.
1. Loss Aversion
Rational manufacturers would not have opposed retailers' price-
cutting unless its expected harms were to outweigh its expected bene-
fits.140 Their preferences, moreover, would not depend on their current
practices or market position,14' except insofar as these factors affect ex-
pected profits. 142 In contrast, real-world decision makers typically view
prospects as either gains or losses, evaluating outcomes vis-a-vis a psy-
chologically neutral reference point such as their current position, a ten-
dency that often creates a status quo bias.143 They also exhibit loss aver-
sion, finding the pain associated with the negative prospect of a potential
loss (e.g., losing $1000) far stronger than the pleasure of the positive
prospect of a comparable gain (i.e., $1000).114
Loss aversion and the status-quo bias have been documented exten-
sively.145 In a famous early demonstration, one-half of a group of Cornell
students were given Cornell coffee mugs.146 All participants were then
139. See Daylian M. Cain et al., The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Con-
flicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2005). Note that this effect may have also been reinforced by
anchoring on the initial advice.
140. More precisely, net present value (NPV). See Tor, Entry, supra note 7, at 497-502 (discuss-
ing NPV assessments under perfect rationality and bounded rationality).
141. See Boyan Jovanovic, Selection and the Evolution of Industry, 50 ECONOMETRICA 649
(1982); Tor, Entry, supra note 7, at 498-99.
142. See generally Richard H. Thaler et al., The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status
Quo Bias, in THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 63 (Richard
H. Thaler ed., 1994) [hereinafter WINNER'S CURSE].
143. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and
Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECoN. PERSP., no. 1, 1991, at 193, 197-203.
144. For the original formulation of prospect theory in general, and loss aversion specifically, see
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). See also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the
Framing of Decisions, in DECISION MAKING: DESCRIPTIVE, NORMATIVE, AND PRESCRIPTIVE
INTERACTIONS 167 (David E. Bell et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Rational
Choice]; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-
Dependent Model, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1039 (1991) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Loss Aversion].
For discussion of research on closely related phenomena see Thaler et al., supra note 142.
145. See, e.g., Kahneman et al., supra note 143, at 197-99 (documenting and surveying literature
surrounding status quo bias); Tor, supra note 8, at 264-68. For a description of some of these experi-
ments, see Thaler et al., supra note 142, at 64-68.
146. Kahneman et al., supra note 143, at 195.
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asked to examine a mug and indicate a price for which they would be
willing to sell or buy one.'47 The researchers then conducted a series of
markets in which mugs were traded according to the parties' valua-
tions. 148
Economic theory predicts that about half the mugs would be traded
since about half the subjects who were given a mug would value it more
than those who were not given one, while the other half would value it
less and therefore trade it.149 In fact, however, only about ten percent of
the mugs were traded.' Other studies revealed that the reluctance of
potential sellers to sell (as reflected in relatively high valuations), rather
than potential buyers' reluctance to buy, caused the low volume of
trade."'
In another experimental illustration, participants given a number of
investment options and an existing allocation of investments tended to
make choices that retained the existing allocation.'52 Importantly, similar
findings appear in real-world settings, where employees who are offered
a variety of investment options for their pension savings tend to allocate
their contributions equally among the set of options their institution
happens to provide.' More generally, further studies provide diverse
field evidence, from the equity premium in financial markets, through
downward-sloping labor supply by New York cab drivers, to consumers
who do not reduce consumption following bad-income news, to name but
a few examples.15 4
Yet loss-averse manufacturers will engage in costly preventive ef-
forts, expending resources well beyond the expected financial harm they
believe price-cutting will inflict upon them, to preserve the status quo
and prevent the painful prospect of a potential loss from materializing.'5
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase
Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1328 (1990).
150. Id. at 1332 tbl. 2. This occurred because the median mug owner was unwilling to sell for less
than $5.25, while the median mug buyer was unwilling to pay more than $2.25 to $2.75. Id.
151. Thaler et al., supra note 142, at 65-66.
152. William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 7, 12-14 (1988).
153. Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Naive Diversification Strategies in Defined Contribu-
tion Saving Plans, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 79 (2001) (providing varied evidence for this - naive diversifica-
tion rule, and discussing its underlying causes and economic implications).
154. See Colin F. Camerer, Prospect Theory in the Wild: Evidence from the Field, in ADVANCES IN
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 148 (Colin F. Camerer et al. eds., 2004) (collecting and reviewing numerous
field studies evidencing loss aversion and related phenomena).
155. Cf James A. Fanto, Quasi-Rationality in Action: A Study of Psychological Factors in Merger
Decision-Making, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1333, 1405-07 (2001); Robert H. Frank, Why Is Cost-Benefit Analy-
sis So Controversial?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 913,918 (2000).
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2. Fairness-Driven Behavior
Both anecdotal and empirical evidence suggest that manufacturers
who think price-cutting practices violate norms of fairness in business re-
lations will oppose them more than is rationally justified by the practices'
expected harm."' Anecdotally, manufacturers (and other advocates of
their positions) have repeatedly asserted that price-cutting retailers are
benefiting from the exploitation of the manufacturers' brand names (as
in the case of loss leading) and the efforts of competing retailers."' In
fact, the term "free riding" projects an image of someone who is benefit-
ing from the efforts of others without reciprocity or one whose unfair be-
havior merits condemnation."'
These anecdotes fit well with a large body of empirical studies
showing how individuals oppose behaviors they consider unfair even
when such opposition is costly for them.'5 9 This behavioral tendency is
illustrated by the common rejection in the famous ultimatum game of
positive sums of money by allocation recipients, who prefer that both
they and the party offering an allocation they perceive as unfair get noth-
ing. '0 These findings hold, moreover, even when the game is played in-
volving very large stakes.'"' Recipients' readiness to reject offers of sig-
nificant sums of money reveals that they not only care about the fairness
of the allocation, but are even willing to forgo financial gain to punish the
unfair behavior of an anonymous party they will never encounter
again.162
156. Note that the approach taken here is descriptive. Cf Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a
Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728,728-29 (1986).
157. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text; see also O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc.,
601 F. Supp. 1274, 1276-77 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (involving a retailer challenge to vertical restraints im-
posed by Apple Computer in response to alleged free riding); Kelly, supra note 63, at 363 (arguing that
"[firee riding is not limited to the most sophisticated consumer products" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
158. See, e.g., infra note 168 and accompanying text (describing public goods games).
159. See, e.g., MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES IN THE ECONOMY (Paul J. Zak
ed., 2008); Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM. ECON.
REV. 1281, 1283-84 (1993); Tor, supra note 8, at 268-72, 282-83; Avishalom Tor et al., Fairness and the
Willingness to Accept Plea Bargain Offers, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 97, 98-99 (2010).
160. The ultimatum game literature is extensive. See generally COLIN F. CAMERER, BEHAVIORAL
GAME THEORY: EXPERIMENTS IN STRATEGIC INTERACTION 48-59 (2003) (reviewing and summarizing
main findings in this area). In a typical game one player (Proposer) is asked to allocate a given sum of
money to himself and another player (Responder). The latter must then choose whether to accept the
offered allocation. If Responder accepts, each party gets a share according to the offer; if Responder
rejects the offer, however, both parties get nothing. Id. at 43. (Note that the basic game is anonymous
and without repetition, so considerations of reputation and future retaliation should be irrelevant.) A
rational Responder should accept any positive sum, since the alternative to acceptance is rejection
without any payment. Yet Responders typically reject offers below twenty to thirty percent and Pro-
posers usually offer an even greater proportion of forty to fifty percent of the sum that stands for allo-
cation. Id. at 49-50 & tbl.2.2.
161. Id. at 6(-62.
162. Note that the independent role of fairness-related concerns-as opposed to strategic consid-
erations-in this allocation setting is further highlighted by ultimatum game variants that show that
Responders reject comparatively inferior allocations even where their rejections have no impact on
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Other research shows that fairness-driven behavior persists where
market prices are concerned. For instance, participants in household
surveys of public opinion evaluated the fairness of market behavior by
comparing it to a reference standard or transaction; their responses sug-
gested that parties are generally entitled to the terms of the reference
transaction and firms are entitled to their reference profit.' Price hikes
(or other changes in the terms of market transactions) are therefore
viewed as unfair when a firm exploits a profit-increasing opportunity at
consumers' expense, but considered fair when the firm is merely seeking
to maintain its extant profitability in the face of changed economic condi-
tions.'
Importantly, past transactions between the parties in the market,
especially recent ones, commonly provide the relevant reference point
for fairness judgments.' The terms of the ongoing business relationships
of a manufacturer and its distributors thus would usually constitute the
parties' reference transaction.'6 Manufacturers faced with price-cutting
behavior they believe benefits retailers at their expense will view that
behavior as unfair and seek to prevent it, even at a significant cost.6
This conclusion is further reinforced by experimental studies of
free-riding behavior in public goods games, whereby multiple partici-
pants simultaneously decide how much to contribute to a common pool
out of an endowment they receive.168 The dominant strategy for self-
interested participants is to free ride and contribute nothing, although
the group's total surplus is maximized when all participants contribute all
of their endowment. 69  Early studies found that free riding is pervasive
by the last of the game's usual ten rounds, with about seventy-five per-
Proposers' payoff. E.g., Gary E. Bolton & Rami Zwick, Anonymity Versus Punishment in Ultimatum
Bargaining, 10 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 95, 115-16 (1995); Duncan K.H. Fong & Gary E. Bolton,
Analyzing Ultimatum Bargaining: A Bayesian Approach to the Comparison of Two Potency Curves
Under Shape Constraints, 15 J. Bus. & ECON. STAT. 335 (1997). Other studies reveal the role of Res-
ponders' negative emotional reactions to unfair allocations. E.g., Armin Falk et al., On the Nature of
Fair Behavior, 41 EcON. INQUIRY 20 (2003); Madan M. Pillutla & J. Keith Murnighan, Unfairness,
Anger, and Spite: Emotional Rejections of Ultimatum Offers, 68 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 208 (1996).
163. Kahneman et al., supra note 156, at 729-37.
164. Id.; see also Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, in
RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 101, 112 (Robin M.
Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1986) [hereinafter RATIONAL CHOICE]; Richard H. Thaler, The
Ultimatum Game, in WINNER'S CURSE, supra note 142, at 21, 32-35.
165. Kahneman et al., supra note 156, at 729-31.
166. Id. at 729 ("Transactors have an entitlement to the terms of the reference transaction and
firms are entitled to their reference profit.").
167. See Kahneman et al., supra note 164, at 104-08; supra notes 160, 162; see also Richard H.
.Thaler, Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game, 2 J. ECON. PERSP., no. 4, Fall 2008 at 195, 202-03 (1988) (re-
viewing various market settings in which the ultimatum game might arise).
168. See John 0. Ledyard, Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research, in THE HANDBOOK
OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 111, 112 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995).
169. Id.
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cent of participants contributing nothing and the rest only little, despite
significant initial contributions.'
More recent research revealed, however, that contribution levels
change dramatically when participants can punish free riders, even when
punishment is costly.'7' In this case, participants contribute the dramatic
majority of their endowment and free riding is radically diminished, be-
cause many participants willingly punish free riders at a cost to them-
selves.172 These findings specifically illustrate the prevalence of costly,
fairness-driven behavior that seeks to punish and reduce free riding, such
as that observed in some RPM cases, in an environment in which both
free riding and no punishment would have been universal if participants
were all (or even predominantly) self-interested.
D. A Pro-Resale Price Maintenance Preference
A manufacturer may address the potential harms of retail price-
cutting through a number of alternative business arrangements, each
possessing different advantages and disadvantages. Vertical integration,
for one, is the most effective, providing full control of the distribution
channel, but also very costly and often impractical. Other viable options
include monitoring and compensation for the provision of services, tak-
ing over the marketing effort, and various vertical restraints. Monitoring
is typically costly,"' however, and taking over the marketing prevents
free riding (at retail) but not loss leading or the suboptimal provision of
at- or post-sale services. Therefore, vertical restraints are often a rela-
tively attractive method of defending the manufacturer's interests.74
Vertical territorial restraints reduce or eliminate intrabrand compe-
tition by allocating territories or customers, or by limiting the number of
distributors. They prevent (or lower the probability of) free riding, and
reduce the likelihood of loss leading.7 1 Vertical price restraints include
RPM, as well as suggested prices and refusals to deal, which eliminate or
reduce intrabrand price competition and make it very difficult for retail-
ers to engage in free riding or loss leading. Among the latter restraints,
RPM is the dominant arrangement, while the other restraints seek to
achieve the same purpose indirectly (usually, when the law prohibits
RPM) .176
170. See id. at 112-13.
171. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gichter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments, 90
AM. ECON. REV. 980 (2000).
172. Id.
173. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
174. For a detailed comparison of the different arrangements and their legal treatment, see gen-
erally Grimes, supra note 38; Grimes, supra note 3.
175. See 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, 1 1619, at 219-22; Marvel, supra note 51, at
76. That is, with the exception of exclusive dealing that eliminates it altogether.
176. See Ippolito, supra note 75, at 269-70 & tbl.3 (finding the dramatic majority of the 203 liti-
gated RPM cases between 1976 and 1982, when RPM was per se illegal, involved multiple allegations
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RPM is thus one attractive candidate for combating the practices'
harms. Yet other methods can achieve similar (though not identical) re-
sults without a direct interference with retail prices, sometimes at a lower
cost. A further analysis reveals, however, that manufacturers not only
hold biased judgments and preferences regarding retail price-cutting,
overestimating its harms and being inordinately averse to its presence,
respectively, but may also exhibit an unjustified preference for RPM as
the superior means for addressing these practices. This pro-RPM bias
results from manufacturing managers' overweighting of the retail price
dimension in their choice, their ambiguity aversion, and their need for
risk control. Together, these factors make the direct, clear effect of RPM
on retail prices particularly attractive to manufacturers, in contrast with
those indirect price effects of the alternative arrangements,"' which only
follow their regulation of other aspects of the vertical relationship (such
as marketing efforts or territorial boundaries)."' Consequently, manu-
facturers, especially those who already are averse to price-cutting and
overestimate its expected harms, will be prone to using RPM excessively
and inefficiently.
1. Overweighting the Price Dimension
A number of processes lead manufacturers to overweight the price
dimension-that is, the impact on retail prices-when choosing among
distribution arrangements. For this reason, while a rational manufactur-
er would seek to reduce the potential harmful effects of price-cutting by
the most efficient means, its real-world counterparts are excessively con-
cerned with the elimination of price-cutting itself, a task for which RPM
is best suited.
When decision makers choose among options, they usually seek an
alternative that dominates the other options in all respects.179 If no such
alternative is available, they tend to prefer the option that is superior
with respect to a single, most important attribute (instead of comparing
beyond RPM, such that only 18.5% of the private cases in the sample did not include other antitrust
charges); Paldor, supra note 6, at 320-21; supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text (discussing the
Colgate doctrine in relation to RPM).
177. The direct effect of RPM may also make it preferable to manufacturers due to decision mak-
ers' tendency to neglect indirect effects-such as those of the alternative arrangements-in competi-
tive settings. See Avishalom Tor & Max H. Bazerman, Focusing Failures in Competitive Environ-
ments: Explaining Decision Errors in the Monty Hall Game, the Acquiring a Company Problem, and
Multiparty Ultimatums, 16 J. BEHAv. DECISION MAKING 353 (2003).
178. The sole exception is vertical integration, which results in a complete regulation of the distri-
bution within the integrated firm. This method does not offer an alternative to price control in most
cases due to its extremely high costs and far-reaching consequences. In addition, there are many in-
dustries and products in which integration is irrelevant (e.g., prepackaged food). Vertical integration
will, therefore, not be included in the following comparison. Cf Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline
Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1122-23 (2009) (finding no antitrust liability for disparities between
wholesale and retail prices within a vertically integrated firm).
179. Amos Tversky et al., Contingent Weighting in Judgment and Choice. 95 PSYCHOL. REV. 371,
372 (1988).
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the various options' benefits and costs, for example).'" This approach is
attractive for avoiding difficult, time-consuming trade-offs between the
various attributes of the competing alternatives. 8' It also provides a
compelling reason for choice, which can later be used to explain and jus-
tify it to oneself and others.18
Research further reveals that the importance of an attribute de-
pends on how the choice task is framed.183  Decision frames impact
choice, for instance, because they make those attributes of the available
alternatives that relate most clearly and directly to the problem as
framed appear more compatible with the task.'* In the present case,
therefore, compatibility implies that the price dimension will be promi-
nent in manufacturers' choice of a preventive measure. Consequently,
RPM, which is superior with respect to the prominent price attribute, will
also appear more attractive overall and thus will be chosen more often
than the alternative distribution arrangements that are less frame-
compatible."'s
180. Eldar Shafir et al., Reason-Based Choice, 49 COGNITION 11, 15 (1993); Tversky et al., supra
note 179, at 372-75. The significance people attach to the prominent attribute in choice can be illu-
strated by a study that presented participants with pairs of gift packages consisting of cash and cou-
pons. For each pair, a component of one alternative was missing (e.g., package A included no cash
and a coupon for book purchase worth thirty-two dollars, while package B included twenty dollars and
a coupon worth eighteen dollars). Participants were asked to determine the value of the missing com-
ponent (e.g., an amount of cash in package A) that would render the two alternatives equally attrac-
tive (e.g., ten dollars). A week later, the same participants were asked to choose between the alterna-
tives they previously equated. They were also asked, independently, which dimension-cash or
coupons-they considered more important. When choosing between the packages, eighty-eight per-
cent of the participants chose the alternative that was superior on the dimension they considered more
important, despite having equated the packages' value a week earlier. Paul Slovic, Choice Between
Equally Valued Alternatives, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 280
(1975).
181. Tversky et al., supra note 179, at 372.
182. ROBYN M. DAwES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 146-51 (1988); Shafir et
al., supra note 180, at 14-15.
183. See, e.g., Barbara J. McNeil et al., On the Framing of Medical Decisions, in DECISION
MAKING: DESCRIPTIVE, NORMATIVE, AND PRESCRIPTIVE INTERACTIONS, supra note 144, at 562;
Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice, supra note 144, at 167; see also Tor, supra note 8, at 260-63
(providing an overview of framing effects). For the original development of the concept of decision
frames and demonstration of their effects on people's preference, see Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981).
184. As Tversky et al. explain, "[a]ccording to this principle, the weight of any input component is
enhanced by its compatibility with the output." Tversky et al., supra note 179, at 376 (using compati-
bility to explain the difference in valuations as a result of the procedure used to elicit them). Compa-
tibility effects are numerous and not limited to choice problems, found even in perception tasks, where
people respond faster to stimuli that are response-compatible. Compatibility might therefore reflect
the way basic mental processes function rather than a heuristic process that is specific to more complex
decision-making processes. See Marcus Selart, Aspects of Compatibility and the Construction of Pref-
erence, in DECISION MAKING: COGNITIVE MODELS AND EXPLANATIONS 58 (Rob Ranyard et al. eds.,
1997).
185. The effects of compatibility are likely to be compounded by focusing, where RPM is pre-
ferred since it better fits the model of the price-cutting problem. Because of focusing, manufacturers
are also less likely to thoroughly examine alternative solutions once the model-fitting solution has
been found. See P. Legrenzi et al., Focusing in Reasoning and Decision Making, 49 COGNITION 37, 38-
39, 53, 60 (1993); see also John R. Chambers, Why the Parts Are Better (or Worse) than the Whole: The
Unique-Attributes Hypothesis, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 268, 273-24 (2010) (finding a similar effect results
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2. Overestimating the Benefits of Resale Price Maintenance
While the overweighting of the price-dimension biases manufactur-
ers towards RPM, other decision processes lead them to overvalue the
benefits of this restraint. Exhibiting a certainty effect, for one, individuals
discount the weight they assign to outcomes that are merely probable as
compared to certain ones.'" For example, most people prefer a sure win
of thirty dollars to an eighty percent chance of winning forty-five dol-
lars." Another implication of the certainty effect, which pertains to our
analysis, is that people value the elimination of risk (e.g., a reduction of
risk from a ten percent to a zero percent chance) more than they value its
comparable reduction (e.g., from twenty percent to a ten percent
chance)." Managers subject to the certainty effect will thus overvalue
RPM's elimination of price-cutting compared to its mere reduction by
territorial restraints, even when the latter are more efficient.
The risk-eliminating advantages of RPM also make it attractive to
manufacturers due to comparative ambiguity aversion. When choosing
among alternatives, people typically prefer well-defined risks whose
probability distribution is known to options involving unspecified or am-
biguous risks.189 Further studies show that ambiguity aversion operates in
the domain of losses as well as in the domain of gains. In one study, for
example, participants playing the roles of buyers and sellers of business
insurance valued the insurance more highly when faced with an ambi-
from the tendency to use the dimension distinguishing the target of evaluation (e.g., RPM) positively
or negatively from other group members (i.e., other distribution restraints) as the standard for evalua-
tion, which makes the target appear particularly positive or negative).
186. Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice, supra note 144, at 182; cf infra note 189 (discussing
the subadditivity of ambiguous prospects).
187. Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice, supra note 144, at 182.
188. See Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J.
61, 76 (2002).
189. See, e.g., Stanley Kaplan & B. John Garrick, On the Quantitative Definition of Risk, 1 RISK
ANALYSIS 11, 19-22 (1981); Donald P. Morgan, Rating Banks: Risk and Uncertainty in an Opaque In-
dustry, 92 Am. ECON. REV. 874, 874-75 (2002). Ellsberg provided an early example of ambiguity
avoidance when he asked people to consider a bet on the color of a ball that would be randomly drawn
from one of two imaginary urns, each of which holds red and black balls: Urn I contains one hundred
balls with unknown proportions of red and black balls, while Urn II contains fifty black balls and fifty
red ones. When the urns are considered separately, most people are indifferent between betting on a
black ball and betting on a red one; they perceive that there is an equal (0.5) chance of drawing a ball
of a particular color from Urn I with its unknown proportion of balls of the two colors, as well as a
similar (0.5) chance of drawing such a ball from Urn II, which contains equal numbers of black and red
balls. Nevertheless, when asked to bet on the drawing of a red ball from one of the urns, most people
prefer to bet on a drawing from Urn II with its known proportion of balls. Moreover, when asked to
bet again, but this time on a black ball, they tend again to prefer the well-defined prospect of drawing
the ball from Urn II to drawing it from Urn I with its ambiguous probability. Daniel Ellsberg, Risk,
Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q.J. ECON. 643, 650-56 (1961). Note that it is also possible that
the combined probability for drawing either a red or a black ball from Urn II is higher than Urn I.
Nevertheless. further studies have shown the paradoxical choices of the subjects reflect the subadditiv-
ity of complimentary ambiguous prospects rather than the superadditivity of well-defined ones. See
Hillel J. Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth, Decision Making Under Ambiguity, in RATIONAL CHOICE,
supra note 164, at 41, 44-46.
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guous probability of loss than when faced with a comparable but unam-
biguous probability of loss."*
Importantly, ambiguity aversion occurs for comparisons between
ambiguous and well-defined alternatives.'91 Thus, although decision
makers routinely make decisions under ambiguity (or uncertainty), they
typically discount the value of ambiguous options relative to unambi-
guous ones and choose the latter over the former if given the opportunity
to do so.1" Moreover, recent evidence also suggests that ambiguity aver-
sion results from comparative ignorance-that is, the comparison one
makes with more familiar events or more knowledgeable individuals."9
Manufacturers, averse to the ambiguous, potentially negative, con-
sequences of price-cutting, may prefer instead to bear the familiar costs
associated with price control through RPM. In the same vein, ambiguity
aversion is also likely to make alternative vertical restraints, whose effi-
cacy in preventing the harms of price-cutting is more ambiguous, seem
less attractive when compared to the clearer costs associated with RPM.
Beyond the effects of certainty and ambiguity, research suggests
that managers in particular view risk as a challenge that they attempt to
overcome with the exercise of skill, rather than as a factor that merely af-
fects the expected value of different options.194 This managerial risk-
control attitude suggests that manufacturers will often focus on creating
business arrangements that minimize the risks of price-cutting instead of
engaging in a cost-benefit analysis of alternative distribution restraints.'
There is even specific evidence of managers' efforts to control risks
even when objectively impractical or inefficient,196 much like giving the
common "illusion of control," in which people behave as if random
events-such as lotteries-are controllable.197 Moreover, decision mak-
ers' attempts to control chance events are enhanced in the presence of
competition, when decisions are made in familiar contexts, and when
people can choose among alternative behaviors.' Yet all of these fac-
190. See Einhorn & Hogarth, supra note 189, at 51-64 (discussing several studies).
191. Craig R. Fox & Amos Tversky, Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance, 110 Q.J.
EcON. 585, 587-8 (1995).
192. Id.
193. Id.; see also Craig R. Fox & Martin Weber, Ambiguity Aversion, Comparative Ignorance, and
Decision Context, 88 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 476 (2002) (providing
further evidence for the comparative ignorance account of ambiguity aversion).
194. See ZUR SHAPIRA, RISK TAKING: A MANAGERIAL PERSPECTIVE 72-83 (1995); James G.
March & Zur Shapira, Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking, 33 MGMT. SCI. 1404, 1410-11
(1987); see also Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive
Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 MGMT. SCI. 17 (1993).
195. Cf SHAPIRA, supra note 194, at 73-74.
196. See id. (quoting studies).
197. See Ellen J. Langer, The Illusion of Control, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra
note 109, at 231, 231-32. For instance, exhibiting this illusion, people who choose a lottery ticket de-
mand a significantly higher price for selling it than do those who received a similar ticket without
choice. Id. at 236-37.
198. Id. at 237-38.
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tors-competition, familiarity, and choice-are common in managerial
decision making, which might explain managers' strong tendency to at-
tempt to control chance events. Furthermore, managerial activities typi-
cally involve a combination of skill and luck that further reinforces the
illusion of control. 1
In fact, the illusion of control belongs to a broader family of egocen-
tric and motivational biases.20 For instance, individuals overestimate
their abilities and skills in domains ranging from driving ability and aca-
demic achievements to investment performance and professional suc-
cess.201 Egocentric biases also lead them to align their expectations about
the outcomes of events with their preferences about these outcomes,202
especially when people have a measure of control over outcomes. 203
Importantly, there is an increasing body of evidence that senior
managers exhibit particularly strong egocentric and motivational biases,
for instance overestimating their companies' and their own potential and
performance. 20 Managers' biased perceptions also impact their business
decision making, from the choice of when and how to finance the firm's
activities to corporate acquisitions and more.205 These processes, there-
199. Cf id. at 232, 238.
200. See Tor, Entry, supra note 7, at 504-05 & n.88; see also, Dale W. Griffin & Carol A. Varey,
Towards a Consensus on Overconfidence, 65 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 227, 228 (1996); Lee Ross et al., The "False Consensus Effect": An Egocentric Bias in So-
cial Perception and Attribution Processes, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 279 (1977).
201. E.g., David Dunning et al., Ambiguity and Self-Evaluation: The Role of Idiosyncratic Trait
Definitions in Self-Serving Assessments of Ability, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1082 (1989);
Terrance Odean, Volume, Volatility, Price, and Profit When All Traders Are Above Average, 53 J. FIN.
1887 (1998); Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful than Our Fellow Drivers?, 47
ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 143 (1981); Shelley E. Taylor & Jonathon D. Brown, Illusion and Well-Being: A
Social Psychological Perspective on Mental Health, 103 PSYCHOL. BULL. 193 (1988).
202. See, e.g., Elisha Babad, Wishful Thinking and Objectivity Among Sports Fans, 2 Soc. BEHAV.
231 (1987); Elisha Babad & Yosi Katz, Wishful Thinking-Against All Odds, 21 J. APPLIED Soc.
PSYCHOL. 1921 (1991); David V. Budescu & Meira Bruderman, The Relationship Between the Illusion
of Control and the Desirability Bias, 8 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 109 (1995); Donald Granberg &
Edward Brent, When Prophecy Bends: The Preference-Expectation Link in U.S. Presidential Elections,
1952-1980, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 477,477-79 & tbl.1 (1983); Robert A. Olsen, Desira-
bility Bias Among Professional Investment Managers: Some Evidence from Experts, 10 J. BEHAV.
DECISION MAKING 65, 66-70 (1997); Roy M. Poses & Michele Anthony, Availability, Wishful Think-
ing, and Physicians' Diagnostic Judgments for Patients with Suspected Bacteremia, 11 MED. DECISION
MAKING 159, 165-67 (1991); George Wright & Peter Ayton, Subjective Confidence in Forecasts: A
Response to Fischhoff and MacGregor, 5 J. FORECASTING 117 (1986) (all reporting biases in predic-
tions and estimates in the direction of participants' preferences, in both laboratory studies and obser-
vational data).
203. E.g., Babad, supra note 202; Babad & Katz, supra note 202; Granberg & Brent, supra note
202.
204. See, e.g., Kahneman & Lovallo, supra note 194; Laurie Larwood & William Whittaker, Man-
agerial Myopia: Self-Serving Biases in Organizational Planning, 62 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 194 (1977);
March & Shapira, supra note 194; P.G. Moore, The Manager's Struggles with Uncertainty, 140
J. ROYAL STAT. SOC'Y: SERIES A GEN. 129 (1977).
205. E.g., John A. Doukas & Dimitris Petmezas, Acquisitions, Overconfident Managers and Self-
Attribution Bias, 13 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 531 (2007); Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, Who Makes
Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market's Reaction, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 20 (2008); Richard
Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. Bus. 197 (1986); Ulrike Malmendier et al.,
Overconfidence and Early-Life Experiences: The Impact of Managerial Traits on Corporate Financial
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fore, are likely to reinforce manufacturers' beliefs in their ability to con-
trol the risks of price-cutting on the one hand, and lead them to overes-
timate the success of their RPM programs on the other.2 06
III. THE SLOw DEMISE OF BOUNDEDLY RATIONAL RESALE PRICE
MAINTENANCE
Part II marshals forth a large body of behavioral research indicating
that some real world manufacturers exhibit a pro-RPM bias. Yet we
might expect that, notwithstanding their behavioral tendencies, manufac-
turing managers will not manifest such inefficient behavior when making
repeated business decisions, operating within firms in market settings.
Both the historical evidence and behavioral research reveal, however,
that the efficacy of repeated decisions, organizations, and market pres-
sure in correcting manufacturer bias is limited. Consequently, when anti-
trust law poses no constraints on RPM, some manufacturers will overuse
it for extensive periods of time.
A. Natural Experiments
The history of RPM in the United States provides a "natural exper-
iment" in which naturally occurring phenomena that are the product of
social or political forces allow for a comparison between a period when
RPM was legalized to a period when the practice was illegal. 208
During the period in which RPM was legalized under fair trade
laws, many manufacturers employed RPM in their distribution systems.209
Policies (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15,659, 2010), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl5659.
206. Moreover, through motivated reasoning, manufacturers' bias may further reinforce their
negative view of price-cutting, its harms and unfairness, as well as their positive judgments of the bene-
fits of RPM. Thus, the empirical findings on egocentric biases also show decision makers engage in
motivated reasoning, investing ambiguous information with the meaning or implications they would
prefer it to have. See Scott T. Allison et al., On Being Better but Not Smarter than Others: The Mu-
hammad Ali Effect, 7 Soc. COGNITION 275, 282-89 (1989) (especially studies 2 and 3); David Dunning
et al., Self-Serving Prototypes of Social Categories, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 957 (1991)
(showing how people judge positive traits to be overwhelmingly more characteristic of themselves
than negative attributes, define personal attributes in idiosyncratic ways that emphasize their per-
ceived strengths, and exhibit a great bias when they can choose the dimension on which to focus their
judgment). For an in-depth discussion of the role of ambiguity in related phenomena, see Tor, Entry,
supra note 7, at 524-28.
207. For an overview of natural experiments, see Thad Dunning, Improving Causal Inference:
Strengths and Limitations of Natural Experiments, 61 POL. RES. Q. 282 (2008). See also David A. Butz
& Andrew N. Kleit, Are Vertical Restraints Pro- or Anticompetitive? Lessons from Interstate Circuit, 44
J.L. & ECON. 131 (2001); James C. Cooper et al., Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference, 23
INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 639, 648-58 & tbl.1 (2005) (surveying seventeen empirical studies of vertical ex-
clusion).
208. Dunning, supra note 207, at 282-83 (noting that such experiments have some distinct advan-
tages over laboratory studies).
209. See Edward S. Herman, A Statistical Note on Fair Trade, 4 ANTITRUST BULL. 583, 587 (1959)
(detailing how as many as nine hundred manufacturers utilized RPM, and the goods they produced
amounted to seven percent of total retail sales in the United States).
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As only a number of states passed fair trade laws enabling the practice of
RPM, state-based comparisons of price trends during the period shed
some light on the impact of such arrangements.
One study compared prices and market trends before and after the
repeal of the fair trade laws, strongly suggesting RPM is inefficient.2 10 In
particular, the study found, based on price trends of fair trade versus
non-fair-trade goods, that consumers saved between one and two billion
dollars in the twelve-month period following repeal.211 Prices of discount
retailers fell by 11.6% from those maintained prior to repeal, whereas
the prices of non-discounting retailers fell only by 1.8%.212
Another study investigated the output effects of RPM on liquor
sales by comparing sales in fair-trade states and non-fair-trade states be-
tween 1974 and 1978-that is, before and after the repeal.213 The results
revealed RPM lowered per capita liquor consumption by eight percent,
controlling for other factors.214 In California, liquor store licenses
dropped in value between twenty-three percent and twenty-five percent
following the repeal.215 These findings provide clear examples of output-
decreasing, inefficient RPM.216
Post-repeal studies also uncovered the fact that early RPM agree-
ments were very popular in unconcentrated markets.217 For certain stan-
dard-fare convenience goods, such as toothpaste, cereal, shaving razors,
and chewing gum, manufacturers were eager to set minimum retail prices
to avoid price-cutting, which they believed might degrade their brand's
image or reputation.2 18  Most modern service-related accounts of RPM
simply did not apply to these product markets. 219
Notably, during the period of the fair-trade laws, RPM agreements
proliferated, as estimates suggest that prices subject to these agreements
210. Lawrence Shepard, The Economic Effects of Repealing Fair Trade Laws, 12 J. CONSUMER
AFF. 220 (1978).
211. Id.at227.
212. Id. at 230 tbl.3.
213. Stanley I. Ornstein & Dominique M. Hanssens, Resale Price Maintenance: Output Increasing
or Restricting? The Case of Distilled Spirits in the United States, 36 J. INDUS. ECON. 1 (1987).
214. Id. at 5.
215. Id. at 6-7.
216. Studies of periods of legal RPM in other countries provide similar findings that further cor-
roborate the conclusion that RPM creates inefficient outcomes. See, e.g., F.D. Boggis, The European
Economic Community, in RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE, supra note 20, at 179, 215-16; Skeoch, supra
note 67, at 29, 61; B.S. Yamey, United Kingdom, in RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE, supra note 20, at
249, 293-95.
217. See, e.g., Hollander, supra note 20, at 81.
218. See Robert L. Steiner, How Manufacturers Deal with the Price-Cutting Retailer: When Are
Vertical Restraints Efficient?, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 407, 436 (1997).
219. Id.; see also Philip L. Hersch, The Effects of Resale Price Maintenance on Shareholder Wealth:
The Consequences of Schwegmann, 42 J. INDUS. ECoN. 205, 214 (1994) ("Notwithstanding these re-
sults, evidence was uncovered of systematic differences in the efficacy of RPM based on firm and mar-
ket characteristics. With respect to why manufacturers adopt RPM, support was found for the dealer
cartel, free-rider, and product reputation hypotheses, with the latter being somewhat tenuous. Sup-
port was not found for the manufacturer cartel or price discrimination hypotheses.").
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ranged from four to ten percent of retail sales.220 The American Fair
Trade Council claimed that during the peak period of 1950-1952, almost
sixteen hundred manufacturers were using RPM.221 After 1950, RPM
gradually decreased in popularity, and both the political will and eco-
nomic support for the practice waned until the fair-trade laws were re-
pealed in 1976.222 At the time of repeal, only twenty-four states still had
such laws.2 3
This significant, albeit slow, decline in the popularity of legal RPM
even before the repeal of the fair-trade laws suggests that many of those
manufacturers who initially thought it attractive decided to discontinue
the practice after ultimately finding it unprofitable. 224
The same pattern-initial enthusiasm followed by a subsequent de-
cline in popularity-occurred in European countries as well, indicating
that the variation in state laws alone tells only part of the story. For ex-
ample, in Denmark, Sweden, Germany, and the United Kingdom, the
practice peaked and subsequently declined during the mid-1900s. 225 The
transnational evidence therefore suggests that RPM is of questionable
economic advantage for most manufacturers, although many of them
nevertheless attempt to employ it.226
This general pattern is also apparent from observational studies of
individual firms' practices showing protracted periods of "learning" that
generated significant social costs. For example, jeans producer Levi
Strauss employed RPM with its downstream distributors long after its
revenue figures suggested the practice was no longer (if ever) efficient. 227
Indeed, after Levi's use of RPM was discontinued, it experienced a sig-
nificant rise in both sales and profits. 22
The same effect was evident in a study of FTC consent agreements
enjoining RPM by seven audio components manufacturers. 229 The study
suggested that manufacturers utilized these agreements to produce more
220. See Herman, supra note 209, at 586.
221. Study of Monopoly Power: Hearing on Resale Price Maintenance, H.R. 4365, H.R. 4592, H.R.
4662, and H.R. 6367 [H.R. 6925] Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d
Cong. 731 (1952) (Appendix A to statement of John W. Anderson, President, American Fair Trade
Council), cited in Hollander, supra note 20, at 80 n.36.
222. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
223. H.R. REP. No. 94-341, at 1 (1975). And only five had nonsigner provisions. See S. REP. No.
94-466, at 2 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1569, 1570.
224. See Carl H. Fulda, Resale Price Maintenance, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 175, 202-06 (1954) (explain-
ing that state variation in the scope of allowable fair trade laws resulted in a patchwork of RPM regu-
lations, enabling dealers to purchase products free from price restraints and that manufacturers in turn
had difficulty in enforcing these agreements and often abandoned them entirely); Hollander, supra
note 20, at 81-93.
225. See U. af Trolle, Sweden, in RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE, supra note 20, at 101, 109, 125;
Boggis, supra note 216, at 205-08; H. Kjolby, Denmark, RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE, supra note 20,
at 145, 154-60; Yamey, supra note 216, at 252-65, 274.
226. See supra Part II.C.
227. See Oster, supra note 68, at 55-56.
228. See id. at 75-76.
229. See McEachern & Romeo, supra note 68, at 232-36.
No. 3] 841
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
retail shelf space, point-of-sale demonstrations, and quality certification
to help develop the consumer market.2 0 As stereo systems became more
familiar to consumers, RPM agreements and retailer services lost their
importance.2' Yet these practices persisted even as the marketing strat-
egy became inefficient for suppliers of low-end components. 23 2
B. Learning
What seems to be puzzling historical evidence on the slow demise of
inefficient RPM in the United States and abroad can be better under-
stood once we consider the mechanisms through which such errors may
be eliminated. For instance, to learn of their mistake and correct it,
manufacturers who employ inefficient RPM must obtain the relevant in-
formation, analyze it correctly, and choose to abandon the practice in fa-
vor of an alternative vertical arrangement or none at all. Yet not only
does RPM by its nature limit the feedback available to manufacturers
from the market,"3 but it also faces a number of behavioral and informa-
tional impediments at each of the steps: they are less likely to seek addi-
tional information when they form a specific anti-price-cutting heuristic
and exhibit overconfidence in their judgment;234 they are prone to bias
when evaluating their information due to its limited and noisy nature, the
processes that generated their initial bias, and the tendency to seek con-
firming evidence; and they may be reluctant to abandon RPM due to loss
aversion and the sunk costs effect.
1. Impediments to Information Search
When people deal with recurring situations that call for similar
judgments and choices, they often form specific heuristics that account
for common characteristics of these situations, to economize on the time
and costs required for repeatedly making similar judgments and choic-
es.2 35 In contrast to those general heuristics, like availability or represen-
230. Id. at 225.
231. Id. at 226.
232. The study's authors suggested that simple mistakes, inertia, risk aversion, and a prisoners'
dilemma were possible explanations for the persistence of an inefficient vertical restraint. Id. The
authors also noted that similar RPM agreements for high-end audio components exerted positive con-
sumer welfare returns, but the overall effect of the FTC's consent orders enjoining RPM was to im-
prove social welfare. Id. at 208-13.
233. Cf TIROLE, supra note 85, at 188 (noting that in a model of vertical restraints with uncertain-
ty, "RPM uses decentralized information nonoptimally" and "[i]ndeed the retail price is fixed before
the uncertainty is resolved so it is not responsive to demand and retail-cost conditions at all" and con-
trasting this limitation of RPM with the ability of retailers to respond to the resolution of uncertainty
under exclusive territories).
234. A tendency that is compounded by "satisficing," where decision makers seek solutions that
are "good enough" and then cease to consider or search for alternatives. See, e.g., JAMES G. MARCH &
HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 173-83 (1958).
235. Hillel J. Einhorn, Learning from Experience and Suboptimal Rules in Decision Making, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 109, at 268, 269-70.
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tativeness, specific heuristics concern concrete settings, such as "never
order fish in an Indian restaurant" or "do not walk in neighborhood A
after dark." In the same vein, manufacturers who adopt RPM after in-
itially concluding it is their best response to price-cutting may form a
specific heuristic that equates price-cutting with significant harm and its
solution with RPM instead of repeatedly engaging in similar, costly and
time-consuming analyses of their potential responses to retailers' prac-
tices.
The economizing advantages of specific heuristics, however, also
spell their disadvantages and limitations. After all, the very reliance on
such heuristics to avoid constant reanalysis means that decision makers
simply follow the heuristic in the situations it covers. They will not seek
that information which otherwise might lead them to reassess their
judgments unless they nevertheless encounter evidence that these judg-
ments are wrong."1
Despite this inherent limitation, specific heuristics often are benefi-
cial, especially when the initial judgment on which they are based is
sound. Yet when initial judgments are erroneous, as may happen where
manufacturers form an anti-price-cutting heuristic, rule following reduces
the likelihood that additional information will be sought or that initial
mistakes will be recognized.
The specific-heuristic barrier to the reevaluation of initial judgments
will often be reinforced by manufacturers' post-decisional overconfidence
in their RPM choice. 237 Many studies show that confidence in decisions is
only moderately related to their accuracy,238 instead of being determined
by numerous factors23 9 including pre-decisional confidence in the initial
choice,24 perceived expertise, 24 1 and motivation,242 all of which tend to
make manufacturers overconfident in their past choice.
236. Id. at 280-83.
237. See Dan Zakay, Post-Decisional Confidence-Can It Be Trusted?, in DECISION MAKING:
COGNITIVE MODELS AND EXPLANATIONS, supra note 184, at 233, 234-36; cf Jack W. Brehm, Postde-
cision Changes in the Desirability of Alternatives, 52 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 384 (1956) (pro-
viding an early foray into this field of research).
238. See, e.g., Hart Blanton et al., Overconfidence as Dissonance Reduction, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 373, 381 (2001).
239. See Dane K. Peterson & Gordon F. Pitz, Confidence, Uncertainty, and the Use of Informa-
tion, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY & COGNITION 85, 91-92 (1988). See gen-
erally Zakay, supra note 237, at 236-39, 242-43.
240. Arie W. Kruglanski et al., Interactive Effects of Need for Closure and Initial Confidence on
Social Information Seeking, 9 Soc. COGNITION 127 (1991); Zakay, supra note 237, at 239-41; see also
supra note 200.
241. David Trafimow & Janet A. Sniezek, Perceived Expertise and Its Effect on Confidence, 57
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 290 (1994); cf Fox & Tversky, supra note
191.
242. See Baruch Fischhoff & Ruth Beyth-Marom, Hypothesis Evaluation from a Bayesian Pers-
pective, 90 PSYCHOL. REv. 239 (1983); Ofra Mayseless & Arie W. Kruglanski, What Makes You So
Sure? Effects of Epistemic Motivations on Judgmental Confidence, 39 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 162 (1987).
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First, people are systematically overconfident in the accuracy of
their probability assessments. 243 Importantly, people are overconfident in
their level of performance in difficult, but not easy, tasks. 2" We have
seen, however, that the evaluation of price-cutting is particularly chal-
lenging, suggesting manufacturers will be overconfident in the accuracy
of their conclusions.
Second, manufacturers are also likely to perceive themselves as ex-
perts, since they are knowledgeable and experienced in their businesses
area. In fact, both the evidence on egocentric biases generally and the
findings on managers' illusion of control suggest that manufacturers
overestimate their ability and expertise in controlling price-cutting
risks,245 which in turn contributes to their post-decisional overconfidence.
Third, manufacturers are motivated to avoid further consideration
of their decision. After all, a reversal of an RPM strategy after its public
announcement and implementation is bound to be seen by the manufac-
turer, its retailers and competitors alike as an acknowledgment of the
program's failure, as well as a reversal of a strategic commitment. Busi-
ness decision makers, however, are particularly averse to such course re-
versals, in light of the high value they attach to commitment and reputa-
tion effects. Hence, they will sometimes incur significant costs before
publicly changing their declared business strategy, exhibiting a sunk cost
effect.246 In the RPM case, moreover, these motivations may occasionally
be reinforced by the economic benefits some manufacturers receive from
the softening of horizontal competition. 247 Altogether, therefore, initial
overconfidence, perceived expertise, and motivational factors combine to
facilitate manufacturers' post-decisional overconfidence, further reduc-
243. See Sarah Lichtenstein et al., Calibration of Probabilities: The State of the Art to 1980, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 109, at 306. Calibration has also been called realism,
external validity, reliability, and more. Id. at 306-07. For instance, in one questionnaire study of the
appropriateness of extreme confidence only seventy-two to eighty-three percent of the items in one
task to which "definite" responses were given were correct, while in another task items that were as-
signed the extreme probability of zero were in fact correct twenty to thirty percent of the time. Baruch
Fischhoff et al., Knowing with Certainty: The Appropriateness of Extreme Confidence, 3 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 552, 554 (1977).
244. Lichtenstein et al., supra note 243, at 314-17; Don A. Moore & Daylian M. Cain, Overconfi-
dence and Underconfidence: When and Why People Underestimate (and Overestimate) the Competition,
103 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 197 (2007).
245. See supra Part III.B.
246. See Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Cost, 35 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 124 (1985); Gregory B. Northcraft & Gerrit Wolf, Dollars,
Sense, and Sunk Costs: A Life Cycle Model of Resource Allocation Decisions, 9 ACAD. MGMT. REV.
225 (1984); Barry M. Staw, The Escalation of Commitment: An Update and Appraisal, in
ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING 191 (Zur Shapira ed., 1997); see also IRVING L. JANIS & LEON
MANN, DECISION MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT
279-308 (1977) (examining the effects of commitment); John S. Hammond et al., The Hidden Traps in
Decision Making, 84 HARV. BUS. REv., Jan. 2006, at 118.
247. Cf supra notes 42, 107 and accompanying text.
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ing the likelihood that they will search for new information to reevaluate
their RPM strategy.'
2. Biases in Information Evaluation
Even manufacturers who wish to evaluate the efficacy of their ar-
rangements may find the task challenging given the nature of the availa-
ble information, the processes that generated their initial bias, and the
tendency to seek confirming evidence.
The post-decisional evidence available to manufacturers is even
more limited and noisy than the information they have prior to the adop-
tion of RPM.2 49 It is limited because RPM largely eliminates both price
competition and the information on how the manufacturers would have
fared if they were to employ an alternative vertical arrangement or none
at all.250 Moreover, manufacturers cannot easily overcome this problem
by comparing their pre- and post-RPM performance, because market
conditions change constantly, making it difficult to isolate the RPM ef-
fect from the multitude of economic factors impacting the manufacturers'
performance over time. 25 1 Furthermore, because the immediate effect of
RPM, almost by definition, is to raise retail prices, manufacturers may
expect the short-run loss of profits, but assume that RPM will prove
beneficial in the longer run. Because of this limited and noisy informa-
tion, however, an otherwise successful manufacturer might remain alto-
gether unaware of an inefficient price restraint, while one experiencing
RPM-driven losses may have little basis to attribute these losses specifi-
cally to RPM rather than to the multitude of other economic factors
shaping its performance. 25 2
248. Cf J. Edward Russo & Paul J.H. Schoemaker, Managing Overconfidence, 33 SLOAN MGMT.
REv., no. 2, 1992, at 7 (discussing overconfidence in managerial decision making).
249. See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
251. For this reason, they cannot employ an approach resembling the simpler and now increasing-
ly popular "difference-in-differences" analysis of empirical antitrust studies of cost and price changes.
See, e.g., John Simpson & David Schmidt, Difference-in-Differences Analysis in Antitrust: A Cautio-
nary Note, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 623 (2008) (discussing the advantages and limitations of this approach).
252. Tversky and Kahneman explain the difficulty of learning to overcome errors:
Effective learning takes place only under certain conditions: it requires accurate and immediate
feedback about the relation between the situational conditions and the appropriate response.
The necessary feedback is often lacking for the decisions made by managers, entrepreneurs, and
politicians because (i) outcomes are commonly delayed and not easily attributable to a particular
action; (ii) variability in the environment degrades the reliability of the feedback, especially where
outcomes of low probability are involved; (iii) there is often no information about what the out-
come would have been if another decision had been taken; and (iv) most important decisions are
unique and therefore provide little opportunity for learning.
Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice, supra note 144, at 187-88 (emphases added) (citation omit-
ted); see also Einhorn, supra note 235, at 273 (emphasizing the importance of unambiguous feedback
for learning); Richard E. Nisbett et al., Improving Inductive Inference, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY, supra note 109, at 445, 445-46 (noting that decision makers need to know that an error
has occurred, how it has occurred, and how to improve the decision process).
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The accurate analysis of RPM's long-term effects is also inhibited by
the same psychological processes that generated manufacturers' exces-
sive reliance on RPM to begin with: their tendency to overestimate the
expected harms of price-cutting, price-cutting aversion, and RPM prefer-
ence. 253 These processes are reinforced by the confirmation bias wherein
people examine hypotheses by studying the consequences of the deci-
sions made based on these hypotheses. 2- Outcomes that fit the hypothe-
sis are deemed to confirm it, whereas those that do not fit falsify the hy-
pothesis. This method of hypothesis testing, however, violates the rules
of logic that call for the testing of alternative hypotheses to find whether
they also produce the desirable outcomes.
In the presence of the confirmation bias, therefore, hypotheses are
falsified only when there is an outcome of the main hypothesis that dis-
confirms it. Yet such disconfirmation is unlikely to occur in the present
case when RPM prevents price-cutting. If, however, manufacturers were
to test alternative arrangements, such as territorial limitations, they may
find these arrangements significantly diminish the practices' negative ef-
fects on their products at a lower cost. 255
3. The Difficulty of Abandoning Resale Price Maintenance
Finally, if the challenges to reaching an accurate post-decisional as-
sessment of RPM's performance are not enough, additional behavioral
phenomena make it difficult for manufacturers to abandon RPM even in
the face of negative consequences. Specifically, loss aversion and the
sunk costs effect, as well as dealer pressure, suggest that manufacturers
will preserve even an inefficient extant arrangement and only change
their course of action when they determine RPM causes substantial
harm.
Loss-averse manufacturers will be reluctant to abandon the status
quo RPM policy for an alternative arrangement (or none at all), unless
they determine the former generates substantially higher net costs, since
the potential pain from adopting an unsuccessful alternative would oth-
253. See supra Part III.
254. For a review of the literature on the confirmation bias and hypotheses testing, see Fischhoff
& Beyth-Marom, supra note 242. The following analysis is based on: Einhorn, supra note 235; Joshua
Klayman & Young-Won Ha, Confirmation, Disconfirmation, and Information in Hypothesis Testing,
94 PSYCHOL. REV. 211 (1987), reprinted in RESEARCH ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING:
CURRENTS, CONNECIONS, AND CONTROVERSIES 205, 205-43 (William M. Goldstein & Robin M.
Hogarth eds., 1997); Joshua Klayman, Varieties of Confirmation Bias, 32 PSYCHOL. LEARNING &
MOTIVATION 385 (1995).
255. Cf Klayman & Ha, supra note 254, at 212-14. The confirmation bias is less problematic
when, regardless of the examination of alternatives, falsifying evidence is likely if the hypothesis is
wrong. For example, a manufacturer who takes over the advertisement of a complex product that
people buy only infrequently might find national advertising ineffective and therefore conclude that
promotion should be done mostly at the local level. The same conclusion could have been reached by
giving incentives to local dealers to promote the product and achieving good results (a "negative hit").
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erwise overshadow the potential gain from a successful one. 56 Similarly,
the sunk cost effect and the factors facilitating it suggest that manufac-
turers will be slow to concede error, drop their commitment to RPM, and
adopt a new course of action, tending to do so only when the negative
consequences of the arrangement appear particularly significant.257
Moreover, the inhibiting effects of loss aversion and sunk costs tend
to be reinforced by dealer pressure. Even where dealers do not possess
sufficient power to coerce a manufacturer initially to employ RPM, their
interest in preserving it can diminish the manufacturer's willingness to
abolish the arrangement. In fact, non-discounting dealers are particular-
ly likely to pressure a manufacturer to preserve an extant RPM program
they have adjusted to. For one, retailers who invested in service-related
arrangements (e.g., expensive showrooms or extensive salespeople train-
ing) on the assumption of guaranteed resale margins would want to avoid
the painful loss of their investment. 25 8 Inefficient dealers, whose higher
costs are not justified by unique quality or a similar attribute, would also
pressure manufacturers to retain RPM, to avoid the severe damage that
free retail price competition will inflict upon them.
C. Firms
The obstacles to learning how to correct an excessive use of RPM
notwithstanding, one might expect manufacturers to fare better than in-
dividuals faced with similar challenges. After all, the former make their
decisions within business firms that rely on organizational routines, on
decision making by agents and often by groups, and on various means for
monitoring and disciplining managers. Firms are also typically subject to
market pressure from their competitors, which may eliminate boundedly
rational behavior. The empirical evidence on managers and firms sug-
gests, however, that the mechanisms for improving and disciplining their
performance are imperfect, significantly promoting rational action in
some settings but not in others. The present Section therefore examines
the potential advantages of firms over individuals in RPM decision mak-
ing, while the following one considers the efficacy of markets in disciplin-
ing its inefficient use.
Organizational routines can be superior to individual decisions
when firms have the time and means to learn from experience and re-
peated feedback, developing "organizational repairs"-that is, internal
256. On loss aversion and the status quo bias, see supra Part I1I.C.1. Note that manufacturers are
particularly likely to consider RPM as their reference point since information about its negative con-
sequences, when such occur, takes significant time to materialize in the best of cases. See supra text
accompanying note 116. Moreover, decision makers distinguish "costs" (such as those incurred by
continuing the use of RPM) from "losses" (like the potential harms of price cutting), viewing the latter
but not the former as negative. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames,
39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 348-49 (1984).
257. On sunk costs effects, see supra note 246 and accompanying text.
258. Note that such dealers may also exhibit their own loss aversion and a sunk cost effect.
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procedures and rules that aim to overcome systematic individual short-
comings.25 9 The management literature provides various anecdotal illu-
strations, for example, of organizations using maxims intended to remind
employees not to make biased attributions, employing strategies aimed
at collecting sufficient and relevant information, and developing methods
for evaluating their information and hypotheses in a more objective fash-
ion.260 Yet organizational repairs appear to have limited success and are
largely unpredictable, tending to be most efficacious when based on bot-
tom-up learning in a specific domain.261 These characteristics, however,
do not apply to managers' RPM judgment and decision tasks, which con-
cern the firm's overall distribution strategy, and are made infrequently,
and at the highest management levels, and are also subject to limited and
noisy feedback. 262
Although organizational repairs seem unlikely to overcome the
shortcomings of managerial RPM decision behavior, managers may bet-
ter approximate rational action simply because they function as agents of
the firm, as suggested by some evidence that agents tend to behave more
rationally than individuals acting on their own behalf.263 For instance,
experimental participants taking the role of agents did not exhibit the
common endowment effect-a manifestation of loss aversion wherein
individuals value entitlements they possess more highly than identical
ones they do not hold 2 4-when transacting on behalf of their princi-
259. See generally Chip Heath et al., Cognitive Repairs: How Organizational Practices Can Com-
pensate for Individual Shortcomings, 20 REs. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 1 (1998).
260. Id. at 4-12 (discussing various common judgment and decision errors then suggesting ways
organizations may attempt to correct them and providing anecdotal evidence for such cognitive re-
pairs).
261. Cf id. at 12-17 (discussing various classifications of repairs along different dimensions and
their likely efficacy).
262. Id. at 12-15 (discussing methods of social feedback). Moreover, the organizational context
may even raise the commitment costs of abandoning RPM. This arrangement, for instance, also con-
veys the message that the company wants to keep a firm control over its distribution channels. Its re-
versal may therefore be perceived as a managerial weakness and harm the manager's position within
and not only outside the firm. See RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL
THEORY OF THE FIRM 235-37 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing "[d]ecisions as artifacts"); cf Kahneman &
Lovallo, supra note 194, at 28 ("Officially adopted forecasts are also likely to be biased by their sec-
ondary functions as demands, commands and commitments." (citation omitted)).
263. The agency relationship between managers and firms also generates some disadvantages,
most notably due to the potential divergence of the parties' self-interest, which is of a lesser concern
here. For further background on managerial incentives and agency costs, see FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 90-108
(1991); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980);
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Oliver E. Williamson, Managerial Discretion and
Business Behavior, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 1032 (1963).
264. See Kahneman et al., supra note 143, at 194; Kahneman et al., supra note 149, at 1326, 1328;
Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 43-47
(1980); supra Part II.C.1; see also Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97
Nw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1228 (2003).
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pals.265 In the same vein, the evidence on egocentric biases suggests these
are less likely to impact judgments made on behalf of others when the
agent has not adopted the principal's perspective.26
The better alignment of agent judgment and choice with rational ac-
tion, however, would do little to assist managers in overcoming the chal-
lenges of judging retailers' practices and choosing the appropriate re-
sponse to them. For one, the limited evidence of agents' increased
rationality pertains only to a few of the multiple processes that converge
to generate manufacturers' RPM preference. Moreover, a closer look
reveals that none of the above advantages of agents over principals is
likely to benefit managers in the RPM case. To wit, the elimination of
the endowment effect in the agents' case was driven by their framing of
the relevant entitlements based on exchange value.26 7 The impact of loss
aversion in the present case, however, concerned the managers' price-
cutting aversion and their resistance to abandoning RPM once adopted,
both of which relate to the managers' own decisions rather than to en-
titlements held by the firm for exchange. 21 Similarly, agents' advantage
regarding egocentric biases is unlikely to pertain to judgments of their
own managerial ability and expertise. More generally, agents' advan-
tages are less likely to hold when managers make judgments and deci-
sions concerning their own performance.269
265. Jennifer Arlen et al., Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency Relationships, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 33 (2002) (finding that experimental participants acting as agents did not exhibit a
significant endowment effect because they framed entitlements in terms of exchange value). Another
study similarly found a significant decrease in the concern for fairness when participants in a bargain-
ing transaction acted as agents owing a duty-such as that of corporate managers-to maximize the
return to the principal. Kent Greenfield & Peter C. Kostant, An Experimental Test of Fairness Under
Agency and Profit-Maximization Constraints (with Notes on Implications for Corporate Governance),
71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 983 (2003).
266. Cf Tor, Entry, supra note 7, at 505 (discussing entry decisions by overconfident managers).
267. See Kahneman et al., supra note 149, at 1329-33 (finding no endowment effect when using
induced-value tokens in Experiment 1); Tversky & Kahneman, Loss Aversion, supra note 144, at 1039.
But see Ian Bateman et al., A Test of the Theory of Reference-Dependent Preferences, 112 Q.J. ECON.
479, 503-04 (1997) (finding some loss aversion for monetary payoffs as well); Ian Bateman et al., Test-
ing Competing Models of Loss Aversion: An Adversarial Collaboration, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 1561, 1576-
78 (2005) (same). See generally Nathan Novemsky & Daniel Kahneman, The Boundaries of Loss
Aversion, 42 J. MARKETING RES. 119 (2005) (exploring the boundary conditions of loss aversion).
268. See Eric van Dijk & Daan van Knippenberg, Buying and Selling Exchange Goods: Loss
Aversion and the Endowment Effect, 17 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 517, 519 (1996) (finding that participants in
an experimental market exhibited loss aversion for exchange goods when traders are uncertain about
future exchange prices).
269. Cf Tor, Entry, supra note 7, at 535-36 (arguing that the advantage of financiers over new
entrants in making decision regarding new ventures diminishes when they adopt the entrants' perspec-
tive). See generally MAX H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING (5th ed.
2002) (reviewing and applying individual-level phenomena to managerial decision making); LEE ROY
BEACH & TERRY CONNOLLY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DECISION MAKING: PEOPLE IN ORGANIZATIONS
(2d ed. 2005) (same); Leigh Thompson & Jo-Ellen Pozner, Organizational Behavior, in SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY: HANDBOOK OF BASIC PRINCIPLES 913, 914 (Arie W. Kruglanski & E. Tory Higgins
eds., 2d ed. 2007) (reviewing research on individual decision making in organizations and stating that
"[t]he fundamental theme is that organizational decision makers... are hopelessly victimized by their
own nonrational thought processes").
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Yet manufacturers may still perform better than individuals when
their judgments and decisions are made by a small group of senior man-
agers with the benefits of multiple viewpoints, cumulative experience,
and deliberation. 27 0 Despite the intuitive appeal of this claim, however,
an examination of the empirical literature provides little reason to be-
lieve senior management groups will reliably avoid individuals' excessive
reliance on RPM. Instead, it appears that small groups sometimes out-
perform individuals but at other times exhibit similar or even more ex-
treme judgmental biases and decision errors; their performance mostly
depends on case-specific variables. 271
270. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance,
55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 19-31 (2002) (arguing that boundedly rational managers function optimally on a
board with diverse viewpoints); cf Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards:
Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797,
800 (2001) [hereinafter Langevoort, Human Nature] ("[I1t may be that optimally functioning boards
require not only a mix of insiders and monitors but also some class of board members who can func-
tion effectively as mediators, reducing some of the dysfunctional effects that come from the inevitable
polarization of the board."); Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from
the Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Con-
trols, 93 GEo. L.J. 285, 289 (2004) (advocating enhanced internal reporting controls that increase as
the risk of self-serving managerial behavior increases); Paul F. Levy, The Nut Island Effect: When
Good Teams Go Wrong, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar. 2001, at 51, 52.
271. See generally Daniel Gigone & Reid Hastie, Proper Analysis of the Accuracy of Group
Judgments, 121 PSYCHOL. BULL. 149 (1997) (reviewing the literature and concluding that groups excel
as judges only under limited conditions and tend to perform at the level of their average members
when performing tasks whose solutions are not easily demonstrable); Gayle W. Hill, Group Versus
Individual Performance: Are N + 1 Heads Better than One?, 91 PSYCHOL. BULL. 517 (1982) (providing
an extensive literature review finding, across a variety of tasks, that group performance was generally
qualitatively and quantitatively superior to the performance of the average individual but often infe-
rior to that of the best individual in a statistical aggregate and often inferior to the potential suggested
in a statistical pooling model); Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and
Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 687 (1996) (reviewing the empirical literature on the relative susceptibili-
ty of individuals and groups to systematic judgmental biases and finding there is no clear or general
pattern); Norbert L. Kerr & R. Scott Tindale, Group Performance and Decision Making, 55 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 623 (2004) (reviewing some of the main findings in this area); John M. Levine & Rich-
ard L. Moreland, Small Groups, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 91, at 415,
438-39 (same). But see R. Scott Tindale et al., Group Decision Making, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 381 (Michael A. Hogg & Joel Cooper eds., 2003) (reviewing a number of re-
search strands in group research and arguing they show the general superiority of groups, despite some
unique biases and problems in their decision making). For examples of specific studies comparing in-
dividuals and groups, see Linda Argote et al., The Base-Rate Fallacy: Contrasting Processes and Out-
comes of Group and Individual Judgment, 46 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 296 (1990) (finding that group discussion amplifies judgment by representativeness when
the individuating information is informative but also increases the normatively appropriate impact of
base rates when information is not representative); Roger Buehler et al., Collaborative Planning and
Prediction: Does Group Discussion Affect Optimistic Biases in Time Estimation?, 97
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 47 (2005) (detailing studies showing an
optimistic bias for both individual and group predictions, with the latter being more optimistic than
those generated individually); Chip Heath & Rich Gonzalez, Interaction with Others Increases Deci-
sion Confidence but Not Decision Quality: Evidence Against Information Collection Views of Interac-
tive Decision Making, 61 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 305 (1995): L.
Robin Keller et al., An Examination of Ambiguity Aversion: Are Two Heads Better than One?, 2
JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 390 (2007) (finding that the majority of the dyads exhibited greater
ambiguity aversion than the two individuals' average); Richard F. Martell & Mae R. Borg, A Compar-
ison of the Behavioral Rating Accuracy of Groups and Individuals, 78 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 43 (1993)
(finding that groups' delayed ratings of behavior were more accurate than those of individuals, where-
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Moreover, some common characteristics of group decision making,
including deliberation, often cause additional biases beyond those exhi-
bited by individuals. 27 2  Groups, for instance, may exhibit groupthink,
promoting an erroneous consensus that does not reflect the information
held by individual group members.273  Their deliberations, instead of
leading to a superior integration of group members' information and
perspectives, may also cause group polarization so that the collective
group view is more extreme than individual members' pre-deliberation
tendencies.2 74  Hence, while senior management's collective judgment
and decision making will sometimes outperform individual managers',
there is little reason to believe they will approximate the predictions of
rational models when faced with the multiplicity of phenomena that gen-
erate the excessive reliance on RPM.
Finally, the firm's board of directors may be able to monitor man-
agers and pressure them either not to adopt inefficient RPM arrange-
ments or to abandon them once there is evidence of their inefficiency. 275
as in the immediate rating condition groups and individuals did not differ; at the same time, groups
also demonstrated greater response bias than individuals); Paul W. Paese et al., Framing Effects and
Choice Shifts in Group Decision Making, 56 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 149 (1993) (finding, inter alia, that groups can increase or decrease individual framing ef-
fects depending on how decisions are presented); Glen Whyte, Escalating Commitment in Individual
and Group Decision Making: A Prospect Theory Approach, 54 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 430 (1993) (finding that groups exhibit more extreme escalation of commit-
ment).
272. See Joyce Berg et al., The Individual Versus the Aggregate, in JUDGMENT AND DECISION-
MAKING RESEARCH IN ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING 102 (Robert H. Ashton & Alison Hubbard Ash-
ton eds., 1995) (developing a framework for comparing individual performance to group settings and
providing evidence, inter alia, of group-level biases in addition to some individual biases that extend to
groups, concluding the impact of aggregation on individual-level biases varies widely). More general-
ly, group processes introduce an additional level of complexity and phenomena beyond those found in
individuals. For a collection reviewing such processes, see BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY: GROUP PROCESSES (Michael A. Hogg & Scott Tindale eds., 2001).
273. See, e.g., IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK (2d ed., 1982) (the original development of the con-
cept and its applications); Robert S. Baron, So Right It's Wrong: Groupthink and the Ubiquitous Na-
ture of Polarized Group Decision Making, 37 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 219 (2005)
(reviewing the evidence on these phenomena over thirty years and arguing it shows that groupthink-
like phenomena are common-though not universal-in mundane, temporary, and even minimal
groups); James K. Esser, Alive and Well After 25 Years: A Review of Groupthink Research, 73
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 116 (1998). See generally Robert J. Mac-
Coun, Comparing Micro and Macro Rationality, in JUDGMENTS, DECISIONS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 116,
121-26 (Rajeev Gowda & Jeffrey C. Fox eds., 2002) (reviewing variables that sometimes cause groups
to exhibit less accurate judgments than individuals).
274. See, e.g., Daniel J. Isenberg, Group Polarization: A Critical Review and Meta-Analysis, 50 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1141 (1986) (examining polarization studies up to that date focusing
on the two central accounts for the effect based on social comparison and persuasive argumentation
processes); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Statistical Means, Deliberation, and Informa-
tion Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 984-1006 (2005) (reviewing biases that may be generated by
group deliberation and dividing their underlying mechanisms into informational influences and social
pressures).
275. We did not discuss other firm constituencies that are interested in its efficient management,
such as shareholders, since those have little impact on its ongoing business strategy. See JAMES D.
Cox & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 183, 327 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing the separate rights
and obligations of managers and shareholders, emphasizing the limits of the latter compared to the
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Yet while corporate boards, which observe and monitor managerial be-
havior and are less personally involved in it, possess some advantages
over individuals, they are largely subject to the same behavioral pheno-
mena that impact managers and management groups.276 Even more im-
portantly, however, boards typically possess limited efficacy as monitors
and are unlikely to cause a reversal of managerial decisions except in
some extreme cases.17 In fact, some boards will have little awareness of
the firm's specific distribution arrangements or their consequences given
their limited information on and involvement with the day-to-day opera-
tions of the corporation.278 And even boards or individual directors who
are concerned about RPM and do not think its use is always efficient will
typically be subject to managers' influence and control and will therefore
not battle them over a distribution policy whose consequences in specific
cases are often unclear.279 Given RPM's nature, intra-firm correction of
its excessive use is thus most likely to occur, if at all, only following a pro-
longed period of clear evidence of its negative consequences.
D. Markets
Even if manufacturers find it difficult to identify mistaken uses of
RPM and correct them, the competitive pressure exerted by their prod-
uct-market rivals may cause either their abandonment of inefficient RPM
arrangements or their failure and disappearance from the market alto-
gether. Yet markets can fully eliminate the inefficient use of RPM only
in limited circumstances.28 For one, noncompetitive markets, by defini-
tion, exert limited disciplinary pressure on the manufacturers operating
within them. Monopolists or even oligopolists in markets with significant
entry barriers may dissipate some of their supra-competitive profits by
former); Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV.
1255, 1267-69 (2008).
276. In fact some biases that are unique to groups, such as groupthink and polarization, may be
exhibited more strongly by larger groups such as corporate boards. See Langevoort, Human Nature,
supra note 270, at 810-11; Sunstein, supra note 274, at 979. But see Bainbridge, supra note 270, at 19-
31 (arguing that the behavioral evidence suggests that group decision making in the corporate board
case is often preferable to that of individuals).
277. See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and
Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 263--64 (2002); Larry E. Ribstein, Partnership Go-
vernance of Large Firms, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 289, 290 (2009) (discussing the ineffectiveness of various
corporate devices, such as independent directors, at monitoring); Robert B. Thompson & Paul H.
Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 129, 138 (2009).
278. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate
Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1071-87 (2007); Ribstein, supra note 277, at 290-91.
279. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004); Iman Anabtawi, Explaning Pay
Without Performance: The Tournament Alternative, 54 EMORY L.J. 1557, 1574-79 (2005); Jonathan R.
Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate Concerning the Relative
Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 329, 343-45 (2003).
280. See Tor, supra note 8, at 310-14 (evaluating some of the arguments and evidence on the ra-
tionality-promoting effect of markets).
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operating less efficiently?' Moreover, the private benefits to manufac-
turers from the softening of horizontal competition at either wholesale or
retail are more significant precisely in those markets that are more con-
centrated at either level.'
More importantly, however, both the empirical evidence and theo-
retical analyses suggest that even competitive markets do not always dis-
cipline boundedly rational behavior." To wit, arbitrage by rational ac-
tors who can identify, exploit, and consequently erode the profit
opportunities generated by the errors of boundedly rational decision
makers is an important source of market discipline.' Arbitrage, howev-
er, necessitates a sufficiently large group of arbitrageurs who can both
identify the opportunity and bear the risk and costs involved with selling
to or buying from the boundedly rational actors; it also requires the
ready availability of substitutes for the overpriced or underpriced prod-
ucts by boundedly rational actors.2 85  Yet these conditions rarely exist
even in sophisticated financial markets 2s not to mention those product
markets in which most manufacturers compete. In fact, rational arbitra-
geurs would be hard pressed to find an easy way to benefit from an ex-
cessive use of RPM that causes the ultimate overpricing of some products
at retail3?
281. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 85, ch. 9; HARVEY LEIBENSTEIN, BEYOND ECONOMIC
MAN: A NEW FOUNDATION FOR MICROECONOMICS (1980) (developing a theory and adducing evi-
dence for the importance "x-inefficiency" -that is, a non-allocative efficiency loss-where firms enjoy
some degree of sheltering from competitive pressures); Giovanni De Fraja, Efficiency and Privatisa-
tion in Imperfectly Competitive Industries, 39 J. INDUS. ECON. 311 (1991); Harold Demsetz, Barriers to
Entry, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 47 (1982).
282. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. Recall also that RPM is possible only for manu-
facturers possessing some market power with its attendant supra-competitive profits. See supra note
40 and the accompanying text.
283. E.g., Thomas Russell & Richard Thaler, The Relevance of Quasi Rationality in Competitive
Markets, in DECISION MAKING: DESCRIPTIVE, NORMATIVE, AND PRESCRIPTIVE INTERACTIONS, supra
note 144, at 508, 508-16; see also Nicholas Barberis et al., Prospect Theory and Asset Prices, in
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 224 (Richard H. Thaler ed., 2005); J. Bradford De Long et al.,
Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, in 1 ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 23 (Richard H.
Thaler ed., 1993). For other accounts of nonrational behavior of both laymen and professionals in fi-
nancial markets, see RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS 237-352 (1991) (financial
markets); Shlomo Maital et al., What Do People Bring to the Stock Market (Besides Money)? The Eco-
nomic Psychology of Stock Market Behavior, in HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS:
BEHAVIORAL MACROECONOMICS, Vol. B 273 (Benjamin Gilad & Stanley Kaish eds., 1986) [hereinaf-
ter HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS]; Stanley Schachter et al., Aggregate Variables in Psy-
chology and Economics: Dependence and the Stock Market, in HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS, supra, at 237.
284. See generally ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000) (providing a readable and comprehensive review of the behavioral
finance literature); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35 (1997).
285. SHLEIFER, supra note 284, at 28-52.
286. This observation is strikingly illustrated by the famous collapse of Long Term Capital Man-
agement, a multi-billion dollar hedge fund whose trading strategy was based on risky arbitrage strate-
gies. See ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 123-42 (2000).
287. Moreover, while in a highly competitive product market competing product manufacturers
can benefit from RPM-driven overpricing, in more concentrated markets or where products are highly
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Similarly, market competition may weed out boundedly rational de-
cision makers who deplete their resources by making inefficient decisions
while their rational competitors enjoy higher profits.' For this to hap-
pen, however, the former must deviate from rational action in ways that
consistently diminish their profits. For instance, overoptimistic traders in
financial markets-as a group-may in fact earn higher returns on aver-
age and thus exhibit long-run survival.2 9
Nevertheless, of all the suggested processes of market discipline the
latter is the most applicable to manufacturers who excessively rely on
RPM and consequently diminish their long term performance. Hence,
when the restraint does not provide manufacturers with increased profit-
ability, markets over time should drive out its inefficient manifestations.
Even this more effective form of market discipline, however, may
only operate over long horizons, since the marginal effects of inefficient
RPM are unlikely to bring about the swift demise of those manufacturers
who employ it.2 " In fact, those who consistently exhibit boundedly ra-
tional behavior may enjoy some economic advantages over their compet-
itors, and occasionally may even benefit from their bounded rationality.
For instance, managers who overestimate their ability to control risks
may take greater risks in other business domains as well and sometimes
obtain the higher profits associated with these risks.
IV. TOWARD A BEHAVIORALLY INFORMED STRUCTURED RULE OF
REASON
The Leegin Court concluded that RPM should be subject to a ROR
analysis rather than an automatic per se condemnation, given its poten-
tial for generating either pro- or anticompetitive effects depending on the
specific circumstances of its use.29' Our behavioral analysis confirms the
differentiated the rational strategic response to RPM may involve the adoption of RPM. Cf Ernst
Fehr & Jean-Robert Tyran, Individual Irrationality and Aggregate Outcomes, 19 J. ECON. PERSP.,
no. 4, 2005 at 43, 45 (showing how individual irrationality may translate to different aggregate market
performance depending on whether deviations from rationality are strategic substitutes or comple-
ments).
288. See, e.g., id. at 44 (describing the common argument "that rational agents will drive the irra-
tional agents from the market because the former make higher profits; thus, the impact of the rational
agents on the aggregate outcome will increase over time").
289. See, e.g., J. Bradford De Long et al., The Survival of Noise Traders in Financial Markets, 64 J.
Bus. 1, 16-18 (1991); cf Tor, supra note 7, at 504-14.
290. As also borne out by the historical evidence of RPM's initial popularity and slow decline
over time. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
291. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 898-99 (2007) (adopting an
essentially open rule of reason approach to RPM while noting, in passing, that courts can "devise rules
over time for offering proof, or even presumptions where justified, to make the rule of reason a fair
and efficient way to prohibit anticompetitive restraints and to promote procompetitive ones" (empha-
sis added)). But see id. at 919-29 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (finding insufficient economic justification for
abandoning the per se rule); 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, 1633a, at 372-73 ("These
propositions ... counsel against per se legality, per se illegality, or an open-ended rule of reason and
suggest instead alternative arrays of presumptions.").
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basic logic of this reasoning even while revealing the more limited appli-
cability of extant rationality-based arguments both for and against RPM
in antitrust law and scholarship.
We found that real-world manufacturers are prone to excessively
use RPM and that market forces are often slow to correct their errors.
At times, the practice generates significant consumer harm, while in oth-
er instances RPM may be used excessively but cause only limited con-
sumer harm. Yet on other occasions, the practice reflects those rational
pro- or anticompetitive calculations assumed by its past analyses.
Although our behavioral analysis suggests that inefficient RPM may
be common when legal, we cannot quantify its incidence, costs and bene-
fits. In this respect, therefore, the novel insights provided here share the
significant shortcoming of extant RPM analyses. 29 Nevertheless, our
findings provide some useful guidance following Leegin's injunction that
"[i]f the Rule of Reason were to apply to vertical price restraints, courts
would have to be diligent in eliminating their anticompetitive uses from
the market."293
We therefore evaluate those few contours of the ROR approach
outlined by the Court first, finding them informative yet of limited power
to resolve the question of RPM's evaluation in a given case. Then we
explain the broader lessons of our novel analysis for RPM's new ROR
which challenges the ROR approaches of both sides in the RPM debate
and provides a blueprint for the effective structuring of the ROR under
Leegin.
A. Leegin Reexamined
Leegin left the future design and development of ROR inquiry to
the lower courts, while citing several factors this inquiry should take into
account. 294 Specifically, the Court enumerated three factors that should
inform the ROR evaluation of RPM: (1) how pervasive such arrange-
ments are in the industry; (2) where the impetus for the restraint origi-
nates from; and (3) whether the manufacturer or the retailer possesses
market power.295
Although still relevant according to the behavioral account, our
analysis suggests somewhat different implications for these elements for
courts evaluating whether a given vertical price restraint is anticompeti-
tive. First, relying on traditional, rational accounts, the Court stated that
when RPM is not widespread in an industry one should not be concerned
about its potential anticompetitive effects, since interbrand competition
292. 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, $ 1633d1, at 382 (noting absence of a practical
way to quantify the actual cost and benefits of RPM in a given case).
293. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 897.
294. Cf id. at 929 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's decision "will create consider-
able legal turbulence as lower courts seek to develop workable principles").
295. Id. at 885-87 (majority opinion).
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will undercut any cartel at either the manufacturer or the retailer level.296
The present analysis largely corroborates this approach where boundedly
rational RPM is concerned, albeit for different reasons. Namely, when
the practice is not widespread, the discipline provided by horizontal
competition is more effective. In such an environment, therefore, manu-
facturers who excessively rely on RPM may be weeded out by their
product-market competitors or learn more quickly to correct their er-
ror.297
When RPM is common in an industry, on the other hand, it not only
increases consumer prices and softens horizontal competition at both
manufacture and retail levels, 298 but it also limits the disciplinary efficacy
of markets. The prevalence of RPM in a given market may also facilitate
its adoption by additional manufacturers, by signaling that price-cutting
is dangerous and RPM is an attractive solution. In this way, an industry
norm of employing this practice impacts manufacturers' judgments and
preferences and reinforces their pro-RPM bias.299
Second, the Court cited the empirical evidence suggesting that if
"retailers were the impetus for a vertical price restraint, there is a greater
likelihood that the restraint facilitates a retailer cartel or supports a do-
minant, inefficient retailer."3 " The present analysis reveals, however,
that retailer pressure increases the likelihood of inefficient RPM through
manufacturer anchoring on the biased information retailers provide. 301
The behavioral evidence also suggests, moreover, that the Court was too
confident in manufacturers' rationality when relying on their "incentive
to protest inefficient retailer-induced price restraints."302 Although man-
ufacturers generally wish to maximize profits, they are less likely to
refuse inefficient RPM than rational models would have us believe, espe-
cially when these arrangements benefit powerful dealers.
More generally, the Court placed too much faith in the procompeti-
tive likelihood of independently adopted RPM. It is true that such ar-
296. Id. at 889-90 (citing ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS
OF PRODUCT DISTRIBUTION 76 (2006); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE:
PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 184-91 (2005)); see also supra Part II.B.2.
297. See supra notes 251-53, 271-75 and accompanying text.
298. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 895-96; supra note 42 and accompanying text; cf Leegin, 551 U.S. at
923 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Increased concentration among manufacturers increases the likelihood
that producer-originated resale price maintenance will prove more prevalent today than in years past,
and more harmful.").
299. Cf Amitai Aviram & Avishalom Tor, Overcoming Impediments to Information Sharing, 55
ALA. L. REv. 231 (2004) (discussing the effects of social norms on the market behavior of manufactur-
ers and showing how they can reinforce extant behavioral patterns even when those become ineffi-
cient).
300. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 897-98 (citing Brief for William S. Comanor & Frederic M. Scherer as
Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 7-8, Leegin, 551 U.S. 877 (No. 06-480), 2007 WL 173679 at
*7-8; POSNER, supra note 43, at 177); cf id. at 912-17 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (expressing skepticism
regarding the frequency of efficiency-enhancing vis-A-vis anticompetitive instances of RPM, based on a
reading of available empirical evidence).
301. See supra Part III.B.1.
302. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 898.
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rangements are less likely to be driven by dealer cartelization efforts, and
our analysis suggests they are also less likely to have resulted from an
overestimation of price-cutting risks due to biased dealer information?
Yet the distinction between "bad" dealer-initiated and "good" manufac-
turer-driven RPM-whatever its merits otherwise-misses the important
class of arrangements examined throughout this Article, in which manu-
facturers excessively (and often independently) adopt this restraint. In
many of these cases, however, RPM will be inefficient even when purely
manufacturer-driven.
Third and last, the Court emphasized the importance of market
power in determining the likely impact of RPM, essentially suggesting
that practice is of little concern "unless the relevant entity has market
power."0 According to this reasoning, retailers lacking market power
cannot force manufacturers to adopt inefficient RPM and manufacturers
lacking such power are less capable of foreclosing competitors from dis-
tribution channels. While market power is clearly an important factor in
evaluating the potentially harmful horizontal effects of a given price re-
straint, 30 we have shown that inefficient RPM can cause harm even ab-
sent retail or manufacturing market power.
Our analysis reveals an additional important role for market power
in evaluating RPM. Because market power implies more limited market
discipline, powerful manufacturers may excessively employ RPM for ex-
tended periods before their error is corrected," while market discipline
will more likely correct the overuse of RPM by manufacturers lacking
market power. Nevertheless, as already noted, the historical evidence
suggests the practice may be resilient even in unconcentrated markets
where it is not pervasive.
All in all, therefore, the analysis offered in this paper does not con-
tradict the Court's position that a positive showing of pervasive RPM,
dealer-initiated restraints, and market power at either the manufacturer
or the retailer levels indicate a given arrangement is more likely to be an-
ticompetitive. Unlike Leegin's suggested guidance, however, our find-
ings reveal that the absence of the above indicators provides only limited
comfort regarding the harms of RPM, except possibly in the case of
manufacturers lacking market power who are subject to significant mar-
ket discipline.
303. Id. at 892 (citing POSNER, supra note 43, at 172).
304. Id. at 898.
305. Cf 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 14,91 1633cl(E)-(F), at 376.
306. This is true not only for dominant firms and monopolies, but even for significant market
players with a differentiated product, as witnessed by the Levi's case study. See supra notes 227-28
and accompanying text.
307. See supra text accompanying note 214.
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B. Revisiting the Debate over Resale Price Maintenance's New Rule of
Reason
Beyond allowing for the reevaluation of Leegin's enumerated fac-
tors, the presence of boundedly rational RPM also reveals a new set of
considerations that the future structuring of resale price maintenance's
ROR should account for. Specifically, the Court suggested lower courts
may "devise rules over time for offering proof, or even presumptions
where justified, to make the rule of reason a fair and efficient way to
prohibit anticompetitive restraints and to promote procompetitive
ones."30s
When pursuing such strategies, lower courts can develop different
inquiry structures and presumptions, ranging from a completely open-
ended approach, through inquiries requiring plaintiffs to make some
prima facie case of the anticompetitive nature of the practice, to pre-
sumptions that the parties can later rebut that RPM is either pro- or anti-
competitive, whether generally or in specific circumstances."* In fact, al-
ready before and especially since Leegin, some courts,"' federal and state
enforcement agencies,"' and antitrust scholars312 have employed or of-
fered many different ROR approaches to RPM.
308. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 898-99. Nevertheless, the Court did not suggest presumptions where ne-
cessary or even desirable, in line with its approach regarding potentially harmful horizontal restraints
in California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
309. See, e.g., 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, 1633b, at 373-74; Lambert, Now
What?, supra note 3, at 1960-2004 (reviewing and criticizing the main extant ROR approaches and
offering an alternative structured approach).
310. See, e.g., In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 315-16 (3d Cir. 2010) (restating
the burden of proof allegations under the ROR as consistent with pre-Leegin case law); PSKS, Inc. v.
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 615 F.3d 412, 417-20 (5th Cir. 2010) (rejecting, at the motion to
dismiss stage, allegations of anticompetitive RPM due to insufficient allegations of the defendant's
market power and anticompetitive effects); McDonough v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 2d 461,
480-82 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (certifying class of antitrust plaintiffs alleging illegal RPM based on common
allegations of coercive restraints that may not survive full rule of reason analysis); U.S. Horticultural
Supply, Inc. v. Scotts Co., No. 04-5182,2009 WL 89692, at *9-22 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 2009) (applying rule
of reason after Leegin and finding that plaintiffs failed to allege sufficiently an unreasonable restraint
on trade or a relevant product market); Spahr v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-
187, 2008 WL 3914461, at *8-11 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 20, 2008) (applying ROR to federal RPM claims,
but holding that the plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged a relevant market); Trane U.S. Inc. v. Mee-
han, 563 F. Supp. 2d 743, 751-52 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (denying a defendant's motion to dismiss a plain-
tiffs RPM claim, despite acknowledging that Leegin requires the court to apply the rule of reason);
Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int'l, Inc., No. 4:07-CV-02-RLV, 2007 WL 4373980 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 11, 2007);
Michael A. Lindsay, State Resale Price Maintenance Laws After Leegin, ANTTRUST SOURCE, Oct.
2009, at 3 n.20, http://www.abanet.org/antitrustlat-source/09/10/OctO9-LindsaylO-23f.pdf (citing Brien
v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., No. 04-CV-1668 (8th Judicial Dist., Sedgwick County Kan.
July 9, 2008) (slip opinion) (applying ROR in state RPM claims)).
311. For example, the FTC modified its previous order prohibiting Nine West Footwear Compa-
ny from "fixing, controlling, or maintaining the resale price a dealer may advertise, promote, offer for
sale any Nine West Products, or coercing, pressuring, or otherwise securing a commitment from any
dealer to maintain a resale price for Nine West Products." In re Nine W. Grp. Inc., No. C-3937, at 3-4
(F.T.C. May 6, 2008) (order) (footnotes omitted), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/9810386/080506
order.pdf. The FTC determined that "Nine West's potential use of RPM is currently not captured by
the factors that Leegin identified as possible criteria for condemning RPM." Id. at 17. A group of
state attorneys general submitted comments urging the FTC to refuse to reopen the Nine West order.
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Understandably, despite the dramatic differences among them, all
extant ROR approaches attempt only to distinguish rational procompeti-
tive from rational anticompetitive instances of RPM. Those who credit
procompetitive justifications for RPM have fashioned inquiries that favor
defendants through burden of proof allocations, presumptions, and
more.313 At the same time, enforcement agencies and scholars believing
RPM is frequently anticompetitive developed approaches that employ
similar tools to plaintiffs' advantage, at least in those market settings
thought to make the practice particularly pernicious.31
Yet the most basic lesson of our analysis is that many instances of
RPM may be neither pro- nor anticompetitive as traditionally under-
stood, but rather manifestations of manufacturers' tendency to employ
this practice excessively. While boundedly rational RPM sometimes
leads to higher prices as well as output reductions that harm manufactur-
ers and consumers alike, however, at other times it may generate effi-
ciency losses but no significant competitive harm.315 Hence, insofar as the
incidence of boundedly rational RPM when the practice is legal is not
negligible-and the evidence marshaled here indicates it is nota16 -the
various extant ROR positions should be reexamined.
Most obviously, boundedly rational RPM appears to challenge pro-
defendant approaches, which view the practice as predominantly pro-
See Amended States' Comments Urging Denial of Nine West's Petition, In re Nine W. Grp., Inc., No.
C-3937, http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/ninewestgrp/080117statesamendedcomments.pdf [hereinafter
Amended States' Comments]. The attorneys general urged the FTC to require Nine West to prove
that "(1) its vertical price fixing caused retailers to provide actual enhanced value or services; (2) the
enhanced value or services increased demand for its shoes; and (3) the increased demand from that
value or those services was greater than the decreased demand caused by the higher price that con-
sumers paid." Id. at 8.
312. Brief for William S. Comanor & Frederic M. Scherer, supra note 300; 8 AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, 1 1633b, 373-74; Grimes, supra note 3; Lambert, A Decision-Theoretic
Rule, supra note 3, at 174; Lambert, Now What?, supra note 3, at 1997-2004; see also Posner, supra
note 48 (suggesting per se legality for vertical restraints).
313. See, e.g., Spahr, 2008 WL 3914461, at *8-12; Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An
Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REv. 827, 830 (2009) ("[P]laintiffs almost
never win under the rule of reason . . .. [C]ourts decide almost all rule of reason cases by finding that
the plaintiff failed to show an anticompetitive effect."); cf Toledo Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Mack
Trucks, Inc., 530 F.3d 204, 225-28 (3d Cir. 2008) (upholding a vertical restraint claim under a rule of
reason analysis after Leegin, and acknowledging that plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating an
unlawful restraint of trade as well as a relevant product market); Lambert, Now What?, supra note 3,
at 1997-98.
314. See, e.g., In re Nine W. Grp., Inc., No. C-3937, at 14-16 (F.T.C. May 6, 2008) (order) (allow-
ing the defendant to avoid the burden of proving procompetitive effects of RPM if it can prove the
absence of "Leegin factors"); Amended States' Comments, supra note 311, at 8 (arguing that the de-
fendant should carry the burden of proving the procompetitive effects of RPM that could not be
achieved less restrictively); Warren S. Grimes, A Dynamic Analysis of Resale Price Maintenance: Inef-
ficient Brand Promotion, Higher Margins, Distorted Choices, and Retarded Retailer Innovation, 55
ANTITRUST BULL. 101 (2010). See generally Lambert, Now What?, supra note 3, at 1973-85 (identify-
ing and critiquing several competing proposals for structuring ROR for RPM).
315. See supra Parts III.A-B.
316. See supra Part III. As explained above, however, when the practice is illegal the proportion
of the (generally lower) overall incidence of RPM that is boundedly rational is likely to be dramatical-
ly smaller. See supra note 77.
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competitive.317 Whether employing an open-ended inquiry or offering a
structured ROR, such approaches assume it is appropriate to place a
heavy burden on plaintiffs to develop a prima facie case showing the an-
ticompetitive effects of RPM in each specific instance."' One might find
this burden unwarranted once we recognize that boundedly rational
RPM can occur even when those factors thought necessary to generate
the practice's rationally anticompetitive harms are absent.311
At the same time, and perhaps less obviously, boundedly rational
RPM also questions the more extreme pro-plaintiff approaches advanced
by those who are particularly concerned about the practice's potential
anticompetitive evils. These approaches often place the burden on de-
fendants to prove the practice procompetitive, either in all cases or when
they cannot show the absence of Leegin-like factors.3 20 Placing the bur-
den on defendants across the board may not be justified, however, be-
cause competitive markets not only make rational anticompetitive ac-
counts of RPM less plausible, but also diminish the likelihood of long-
lasting, boundedly rational RPM.
Significantly, even the imposition of the burden to prove the ab-
sence of factors such as those enumerated by the Leegin Court on defen-
dants may be unjustified. After all, our findings suggest RPM may often
be boundedly rational, but still generate only limited competitive harm.
When coupled with the empirical evidence showing RPM is sometimes
317. Courts' previous attempts to conduct an unstructured ROR at least implicitly take the posi-
tion that an all-things-considered analysis can determine whether procompetitive benefits outweigh
negative consequences. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); cf Lambert, A
Decision-Theoretic Rule, supra note 3, at 169-70; Lambert, Now What?, supra note 3, at 1963 ("Em-
ploying such an unpredictable rule would tend to chill even procompetitive uses of RPM, because
businesses would not want to risk an adverse treble damages verdict in order to secure RPM's bene-
fits.").
318. For instance, to make this showing, post-Leegin courts require plaintiffs to define a relevant
market wherein the anticompetitive effects could take place. See, e.g., U.S. Horticultural Supply, Inc.
v. Scotts Co., No. 04-5182, 2009 WL 89692 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 2009); Spahr, 2008 WL 3914461. This
demand in unstructured ROR inquiries is one that plaintiffs commonly stumble upon, due to the evi-
dentiary difficulties involved in establishing market definition. See Jonathan B. Baker, Market Defini-
tion: An Analytical Overview, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 129, 129 (2007) ("Throughout the history of U.S.
antitrust litigation, the outcome of more cases has surely turned on market definition than on any oth-
er substantive issue."); Michael S. Jacobs, Market Power Through Imperfect Information: The Stagger-
ing Implications of Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services and a Modest Proposal for Limit-
ing Them, 52 MD. L. REv. 336, 357-61 (1993) (noting the difficulty in defining relevant product
markets, which "make proof of those violations more difficult for plaintiffs; and they turn summary
judgment into a more effective remedy for defendants"). See generally Carrier, supra note 313, at 828
("Courts dispose of 97% of cases at the first stage, on the grounds that there is no anticompetitive ef-
fect. They balance in only 2% of cases."). In the same vein, some scholars argue that an appropriate
structured ROR would require plaintiffs to make their prima facie case by proving anticompetitive
effects either directly or indirectly. See Lambert, Now What?, supra note 3, at 1997-98.
319. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
320. See Amended States' Comments, supra note 311, at 8 & n.14; cf Frank Mathewson & Ralph
Winter, The Law and Economics of Resale Price Maintenance, 13 REV. INDUS. ORG. 57, 60-61 (1998)
(describing how Canadian law places the burden of proving RPM procompetitive on defendants, while
recognizing a "loss leader" defense, a "bait-and-switch" defense, a misleading advertising defense, and
a service defense).
BEHAVIORAL ANTITRUST
rationally procompetitive, therefore, the data is unlikely to justify the de
facto condemnation of RPM across the board.
More generally, our analysis suggests the preferred structure of
RPM's ROR depends not only on the balance of its pro- versus anticom-
petitive manifestations, as commonly thought, but also on the relative
prevalence of boundedly rational RPM. At the extreme, traditional ra-
tional accounts of the practice would be of little practical importance in a
market where the excessive employment of RPM is common. On the
other hand, where boundedly rational RPM is not prevalent, extant
ROR approaches may be justified in disregarding it.
More importantly, the ROR should account not only for the inci-
dence of boundedly rational RPM but also for its consequences. Thus,
where the excessive employment of the practice covers only a small por-
tion of a competitive market, it should be of little antitrust concern. In
such an environment, boundedly rational RPM may generate an efficien-
cy loss yet cause no appreciable market-wide consumer harm, since con-
sumers can switch to competing products.
On the other hand, boundedly rational RPM is of greater concern
when commonly used by manufacturers, especially in environments with
more limited market discipline, including concentrated or regulated
markets, where entry or mobility barriers are present.321 In these cir-
cumstances, the practice can harm not only those manufacturers exces-
sively using it but also competition more broadly, reducing horizontal
competition and potentially diminishing market-wide output. Similarly,
boundedly rational RPM in the presence of significant market power
may cause considerable consumer harm and should therefore be taken
into account by the new ROR.
In fashioning an appropriate ROR, however, boundedly rational
RPM should not be considered in isolation, since the ultimate effects of
RPM on a given market depend on the effects of both its rational and
boundedly rational manifestations, taken together. Specifically, we have
seen that at least some of the conditions that make rational anticompeti-
tive RPM more likely-such as the prevalence of the practice in the in-
dustry or market power-also slow down the demise of boundedly ra-
tional instances of this practice.3 22  When such factors are present,
therefore, RPM should be of greater concern. On the other hand, when
these factors are not present and rational anticompetitive RPM is less
likely, boundedly rational instances of the practice may still exist. Yet
the market-wide impact of such instances will tend to be more limited,
especially when those manufacturers employing them face significant
competitive discipline."
321. See Tor, Entry, supra note 7, at 493,546.
322. See supra Part III.B.
323. Notably, moreover, even where boundedly rational RPM may generate some small market-
wide harm, error and enforcement cost concerns militate for disregarding it when structuring a
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Altogether, the behaviorally informed account of RPM and its con-
sequences thus provides a basis for structuring an appropriate ROR after
Leegin: our conclusions militate in favor of placing on plaintiffs the bur-
den of making the prima facie case in RPM's ROR inquiry.324 To dis-
charge this case, plaintiffs could make a direct showing that defendant's
output decreased following the employment of the practice, a showing
that would indicate its anticompetitive or boundedly rational and exces-
sive nature." Alternatively, plaintiffs could provide indirect evidence of
the dangers of the specific practice, by establishing the presence of Lee-
gin-like factors, especially the prevalence of RPM, concentration, or
market power at either manufacture or retail.326
Where the plaintiff has made either a direct or indirect prima facie
case, the defendant should be allowed to rebut. Importantly, such a re-
buttal would have to show not only that the practice sought to address a
real business problem327-such as free riding-but also that the problem
generated measurable harm to the manufacturer. Defendants would also
have to show, moreover, that less restrictive means for addressing this
problem were significantly more costly or less effective.3 28 Otherwise, ab-
sent such a requirement, manufacturers could routinely proclaim the var-
ious theoretical harms of price-cutting in their distribution system with-
out more.
Incidentally, this requirement may serve the added beneficial func-
tion of facilitating the debiasing of boundedly rational managers: namely,
biased manufacturers who are counseled of the need to prove the harms
behaveiorally informed ROR. Cf Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1
(1984) (contending that the cost of condemning a beneficial practice is much higher than the harm of
allowing an anticompetitive practice to continue). But see Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Anti-
trust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685, 700 (2009) (contending that the risk of over
enforcement "simply doesn't exist anymore").
324. As noted above, an open-ended inquiry of whether the practice is on balance anticompetitive
is impractical and sets too high a bar considering the evidence of RPM's potential harms. This is evi-
denced, for instance, by the history of vertical non-price restraints since Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), which placed such restraints under ROR. See Douglas H. Ginsburg,
Vertical Restraints: De Facto Legality Under the Rule of Reason, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 67 (1991).
325. Cf Lambert, A Decision-Theoretic Rule, supra note 3, at 215-16; Lambert, Now What?, su-
pra note 3, at 1997 (proposing a regime in which "the party challenging an instance of RPM would
bear the initial burden... to produce direct evidence of competitive harm by showing that the chal-
lenged instance of RPM had caused a reduction in output"); Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason
and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 18-19 (1977)
(proposing a direct proof approach to vertical restraints in which the plaintiff bears the burden of
proving that the manufacturer's restraint reduced its output of the relevant product).
326. In re Nine W. Grp. Inc., No. C-3937, at 14 (F.T.C. May 6, 2008) (order); 8 AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, $ 1633c1, at 374-77. Note that the dealer-initiation consideration is rele-
vant but less important under the present analysis because it is not very indicative of the likelihood of
boundedly rational RPM, although its association with traditional concerns regarding anticompetitive
RPM still holds.
327. Cf 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, $ 1633e3(B), at 385.
328. Cf Amended States' Comments, supra note 311, at 8; 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note
14, 9 1633e3(B), at 385.
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of price-cutting may be more likely to recognize that their concerns are
not fully justified and possibly even reduce their reliance on RPM.329
In any case, a defendant who is unable to make its own case in re-
buttal could still prevail by undermining a plaintiff's case. For example,
where the prima facie case was based on direct evidence of defendant's
output reduction following the practice, the latter could show output did
not, in fact, decline or that any decline was attributable to factors other
than RPM.3 30 In principle, defendant could also make an alternative
showing that market-wide output did not decline, thereby revealing the
practice was not harmful even if it were excessively used. But such an
opportunity usually would not be meaningful in practice because it re-
quires defendant to overcome the market definition obstacle (and then
further to calculate market-wide output).331
CONCLUSION
Scholars have long debated the merits and demerits of RPM, mostly
agreeing that this practice can have both procompetitive and anticompe-
titive consequences while disputing the relative frequency and signifi-
cance of these two types of effects. Moreover, the Supreme Court has
recently replaced RPM's traditional per se illegality with a ROR analysis,
citing the economic evidence that shows that the practice is sometimes
welfare-enhancing.
This Article argued, however, that all past accounts of RPM have
incorrectly assumed manufacturers are strictly rational decision makers
who only engage in profit-maximizing RPM. Consequently, the fault
lines in the law and scholarship of vertical price restraints have been
drawn between "good" rational practices that are output increasing and
"bad" rational ones, which decrease output.
Yet a behavioral analysis of RPM revealed that this practice may of-
ten be neither procompetitive nor anticompetitive in the traditional, ra-
329. Although this beneficial consequence is not particularly likely. First, manufacturers' exces-
sive reliance on RPM is driven not only by their overestimation of the harms of price-cutting but also
by their aversion to such practices and their preference for RPM. See supra Part II. Second and most
importantly, although the empirical evidence shows the possibility of debiasing, it reveals that correct-
ing judgments under uncertainty is difficult and occurs only under extremely limited circumstances.
Cf Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 200 (2006)
("[L]egal policy may respond best to problems of bounded rationality ... by operating directly on the
boundedly rational behavior and attempting to help people either to reduce or to eliminate it. We
describe legal policy in this category as 'debiasing through law."'). See generally Tor, supra note 8, at
297-300 (briefly reviewing the role of debiasing in legal settings and citing some of the main empirical
findings in this area).
330. Cf Lambert, Now What?, supra note 3, at 1997-2000 (suggesting an approach that places a
similar burden on plaintiffs).
331. See supra note 318 (explaining the difficulty of establishing market definition). In the same
vein, where plaintiffs prima facie case was based on indirect evidence of the practice's harm, such as
by proving the presence of one or more of those market characteristics that make the practice suspect,
defendant could also rebut by undermining that indirect case.
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tional sense. Drawing on a range of empirical behavioral findings and
supplementing them with anecdotal and historical evidence, we showed
instead that RPM is often the product of systematic error on the part of
real-world, boundedly rational manufacturers.3 3 2
Because market forces are slow to eliminate the excessive or ineffi-
cient use of RPM, its presence should be taken into account in fashioning
the ROR after Leegin. We therefore evaluated the factors enumerated
by the Court, finding them relevant to the inquiry if not always in the
way envisioned in that opinion. This Article then explained how our
novel account challenges the more extreme extant variants of both pro-
defendant and pro-plaintiff ROR approaches. We completed the analy-
sis by providing a blueprint for a better-informed, structured approach to
RPM that takes into account its procompetitive, anticompetitive, and
boundedly rational manifestations alike.
Finally, the recasting of a longstanding legal and economic debate
through the analysis of boundedly rational RPM illustrates the potential
of a behaviorally informed antitrust law.333 As shown here, some signifi-
cant phenomena that puzzle economists and challenge the law can be
better understood and addressed when the reality of human behavior in
markets and firms is taken into account, the inherent limitations of such
analyses notwithstanding.33 4
332. See supra Part III.
333. See also Aviram & Tor, supra note 299; Stucke, supra note 7; Tor, Entry, supra note 7; Tor,
Illustrating, supra note 7.
334. See Tor, supra note 8 (reviewing the main elements of the behavioral analysis of law and
evaluating some of its limitations, real and imagined).
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